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I. INTRODUCTION
David Gans and Ilya Shapiro's recent book probes the question of
corporate constitutional and statutory rights through a prism supplied by
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. 1 Fostered by a number of public debates mod-
erated by Jeffrey Rosen, the book is entitled Religious Liberties for Cor-
porations?: Hobby Lobby, the Affordable Care Act and the Constitution
2
( "Religious Liberties For Corporations"). This manuscript delineates
the facts and legal arguments as well as the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Hobby Lobby. Serving as Director of the Human Rights, Civil
Rights, and Citizenship Programs, of the Constitutional Accountability
Center, Gans emphasizes the Founders' conception of corporations and
offers predictions regarding the future trajectory of corporate rights be-
yond the narrow, yet clamorous, domain of religious liberty.3 Consistent
with the weight of scholarly opinion and in sharp contrast to his co-
author's4 approach, Gans denies that for-profit corporations have free ex-
ercise rights.5
The Hobby Lobby decision6 was triggered by litigation brought by
three corporations that sought an exemption from the requirements of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 20107 ("ACA"): 8 "Unless
an exemption applies, ACA requires employer's group health plan or
group-health-insurance coverage to furnish 'preventive care and
screenings' for women without 'any cost sharing requirements.'9 This
provision gives rise to a so-called contraceptive mandate.1l Pursuing an
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. DAVID H. GANS & ILYA SHAPIRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES FOR CORPORATIONS?
HOBBY LOBBY, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014) [hereinafter
when specific propositions are cited, the specific name of the co-author will be cited
where necessary to avoid confusion].
3. See, e.g., GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 72 (stating that the Hobby Lobby
decisions is part of an ongoing effort by the Roberts' Court to rewrite the Constitution to
favor corporations (Gans)).
4. Senior Fellow, Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute.
5. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 14 (stating "[t]he text, history, and purpose of
the constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion all make clear that secular,
for-profit corporations cannot claim to exercise religion" (Gans)).
6. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010, Pub. L. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119.
8. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
9. Id. at 2762 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 3(a)(4)).
10. The mandate is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (f)(2); §§ 4980H(a) (generally re-
quiring employers with 50 or more full-time employees to offer "a group health plan or
group health insurance coverage' that provides 'minimum essential health coverage").
"Any covered employer that does not provide such coverage must pay a substantial
price." Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762. Specifically noncompliant employers must pay
$100 per day per affected employee or, alternatively, if the employer decides to stop
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accommodation that would relieve them from the force of this mandate,
the three plaintiff-firms offered an argument that was grounded on
religious principles and beliefs that were identified in corporate
documents and practices.1 The primary legal issue considered by the
Court was whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199312
("RFRA") provides for-profit corporations with the right to an
accommodation.'3 Prescinding from a review of the Free Exercise
Clause issue vetted by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,14 the Supreme
Court directed its attention to whether RFRA, as amended by the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 15 ("RLU1PA"),
permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to require that the plaintiff-corporations "provide health-
insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the
sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies' owners.' 16 Holding
that HHS's mandate was impermissible, as applied, the Court spumed
HHS's argument that he owners of the companies forfeited all RFRA
protection when they decided to organize their businesses as corporations
rather than sole proprietorships or general partnerships because it found
that Congress did not intend to discriminate against men and women who
wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations.17 The Court also
providing health insurance altogether, the employer must pay $2,000 per year for each of
its full-time employees. Id.
11. The Hahn family, as devout members of the Mennonite Church, own and operate
Conestoga Wood, and they have incorporated their religious beliefs into the governance
and operation of the firm. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. Organized under Pennsyl-
vania law, the Hahns exercise sole ownership of the closely held business and control its
board, hold all of its voting shares, operate the company in accordance with their reli-
gious beliefs and moral principles, and commit to a moral injunction that ensures a rea-
sonable profit in a manner that reflects their religious heritage. Id. The Green family
owns Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel, and they incorporated their unanimous religious
beliefs, including a commitment to "honoring the Lord in all that they do" into the corpo-
rations; to wit, each family member has signed a pledge to run the business in accordance
with the family's religious beliefs and to use the family assets to support Christian minis-
tries. Id. at 2765-66.
12. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-
2000bb-4 (1993). Following the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U. S. 507 (1997), Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000). Evidently, RLUI-
PA amended RFRA and effected a complete separation between RFRA and the First
Amendment. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2761-62.
13. Id. at 2759.
14. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U. S. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-356).
15. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
16. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
17.1d.
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found the Government's related claim-that the objecting firms' for-
profit status extirpated their RFRA claims-untenable.' 8 Implicitly, the
Court decided that free-exercise exemptions for profit-pursuing
corporations are not necessarily a form of unjustifiable favoritism.19
Whatever its merits, the Hobby Lobby opinion has provoked a wave
of scholarship2° and a flurry of rancor.21 The Court's decision generated
18. Id. (noting that HHS has already devised and implemented a system that puta-
tively seeks to respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit corporations and fails to
provide any reason why the same system cannot be made available when the owners of
for-profit corporations have similar religious objections).
19. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 329, 329 (1991).
20. See, e.g., Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is there Religious Liberty for
Money-Makers, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59 (2013) (examining how the legal system
treats business firms in a variety of context); Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby
Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are
RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 278-94 (2014); Brandon L. Garrett, The Con-
stitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 110-36 (2014) (offering a
taxonomy of corporate constitutional rights). See generally Alan E. Garfield, The Con-
traception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible Balance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
1 (2014); Thad Eagles, Note, Free Exercise, Inc.: A New Framework for Adjudicating
Corporate Religious Liberty Claims 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (2015) (looking past Hobby
Lobby in order to examine the potential effects of business regulation on individuals and
developing a framework for considering corporate religious liberty claims); Frederick
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Qf Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby's
Puzzling Footnote 37, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Chad Flanders,
Zoe Robinson & Micah Schwartzman, eds., forthcoming 2015),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2602028; Robin West, Freedom of the Church and our Endan-
gered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social Contract, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (Chad Flanders, Zoe Robinson & Micah Schwartzman, eds.,forthcoming 2015),
http://ssm.com/abstract-2595663; Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise
of Religious Exemptions,38 HARV. J..L. & GENDER 1, 1 (forthcoming 2015) (GW Law
School Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No. 2014-32, GW Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2014-32), http://ssm.com/abstract=-2466571; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Chad Flanders, Zoe Robinson & Micah Schwartzman,
eds., forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2535991;
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (Chad Flanders, Zoe Robinson & Micah Schwartzman, eds., forthcoming 2015),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2609585 [hereinafter, Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory];
Vincent S. J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, IOWA L. REV.,
(forthcoming), http://ssm.com/abstract-2569305; and Harry G. Hutchison, Metaphysical
Univocity and the Immanent Frame: Defending Religious Liberty in Secular Age?, 45
Sw. U. L. REV. at 28, 42-43 (forthcoming 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract=2596872 [here-
inafter, Hutchison, Metaphysical Univocity].
21. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Hobby Lobby Yields More Rancor as Wheaton
College Queues Up to Deny Contraceptive Coverage to its Females Employees, VERDICT
BLOG (July 10, 2014),, http://verdict.justia.com/2014/07/10/hobby-lobby-yields-rancor-
wheaton-college-queuses-deny-contraceptive-coverage-female-employees (d crying the
fact that after the male Catholic members of the Supreme Court declared that closely held
corporations have souls and therefore can use their faith to deprive their female employ-
[Vol. 120:2
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a number of overlapping questions. First, since the Hobby Lobby plain-
tiffs are institutions characterized by the pursuit of profit, limited liabil-
ity, and a legal separation from their shareholders, do those attributes, ei-
ther together or separately, bar them from asserting a free-exercise
right?22  Second, must the pragmatic23 or normative implications con-
nected to the legal structure of for-profit corporations24 require them to
maximize profits, in principle, or can such entities maximize other values
as well, coherent with the deduction that religious exercise may take cor-
porate form for a wide spectrum of actions and purposes that include full
involvement in the marketplace?25 Third, although Justice Douglas has
cautioned us that "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely
worthless as such,' 26 can the plaintiff-firms satisfy the "case and contro-
versy" requirement because they suffered a concrete injury to their own
interest within the domain of Article 11127 or based on a derivative or
third-party theory of prudential standingz8 consonant with the view that
they are more like partnerships, membership organizationsa9 or associa-
tions of individuals, rather than large publicly-held corporations.30 Final-
ly, are the opponents of corporate free exercise correctly presuming that
ees of reproductive health coverage, other organizations, would seek an exemption, and
stating that the Hobby Lobby majority actually played games with accommodation).
22. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 276 (critiquing arguments made by the admin-
istration and leading scholars).
23. Id. at 300 (observing that while society treats corporations as legally distinct per-
sons for some purposes, this is a pragmatic choice rather than a normative judgment that
human concerns do not apply to such firms).
24. See Garrett, supra note 20, at 138-47 (arguing that the legal structure of a corpo-
rations prevents for-profit corporations from being treated as associations for purposes of
constitutional adjudication because under Article III norms the courts are compelled to
ask whether the entity itself suffered a "concrete injury" to its own interests, apart from
any separately identified injury to third parties such as employees, officers or owners
coupled with a second inquiry wherein the corporation must have suffered harm that im-
plicates or be caused by the violation of the right being asserted by the entity and further
suggesting that in the Hobby Lobby case, the Court conflated the distinct issue of statuto-
ry standing with Article III organizational standing).
25. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 20, at 4-5.
26. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
27. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962).
28. Garrett, supra note 20, at 147-53 (suggesting that some rights may not be assert-
ed by an organization i.e., a corporation).
29. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 287-88.
30. For one perspective on associational standing, see Garrett, supra note 20, at
137-38 (expressing the view that the Supreme Court's test for associational standing re-
mains permissive and broad because the Court views an association as a collection of in-
dividuals who retain their separate interests in asserting constitutional rights). See also
Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitu-
tional Rights, 56 WILLIAM & MARY L. REv.1673, 1731 (2015) (suggesting that the Su-
preme Court often accepts the associational argument signifying that corporate rights are
derivative of the people the firm represents).
2015]
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free-exercise claims are purely personal and individual3" as opposed to
being the representative outworking of a voluntary collective group,32 so
that profit pursuing corporations must be seen as non-religious entities
lacking the anthropomorphic capacity necessary to practice religion?
33
These questions and their correlative answers evoke the possibility that
for-profit status and corporate identity are of limited relevance for pur-
poses of pursuing religious exemptions.34 If so, this would signify that
Hobby Lobby ought to be seen as "far less about which entities have
rights of religious exercise, and far more about what rights of religious
exercise corporate [and other] identities may legitimately assert,35 espe-
cially in the nation's current and highly secular age.
36
Since the nation's religious diversity has increased during the past
century, it is decidedly likely that many citizens come from different re-
ligious traditions with different religious views on moneymaking.37 One
corollary of America's "religious diversity is that some participants in
our market economy will attempt to exercise religion and make money at
the same time. 3 8 The union of religion and moneymaking poses thorny
issues within the domain of religious liberty law. Solving the riddle of
31. See, e.g., GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 14 (stating that "[t]he fundamental
right that the free exercise guarantee protects is a personal one" grounded in "human dig-
nity" (Gans)).
32. See, e.g., Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 299 ("It is a brute social fact that
people practice religion collectively. [Thus][t]o protect religion only with[] the [realm]
of... conscience or individual action would do great violence to lived religion."). See
also Ronald Osborn, The Great Subversion: The Scandalous Origins of Human Rights,
HEDGEHOG REV. 91, 98 (2015) (suggesting that the spread of Christian moral intuitions
and the concept of community were redefined as a voluntary association of individuals).
33. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of HHS, 724 F.3d 377, 385
(3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-356) (offering the
conclusory contention that Conestoga, as a "secular, for-profit corporation[]," lacks
RFRA protection, because general business corporations do not, separate and apart from
the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion-
they do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated ac-
tions). See also Gilardi v. U. S. Dept. Health & Hum. Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1214 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (ruling that "[w]hen it comes to corporate entities, only religious organizations
are accorded the protection .... "). See also Garrett, supra note 20, at 141 (noting that
the D.C. Circuit has found that there no basis for concluding that a "secular" organization
can exercise religion). The acceptance of these claims means that for-profit corporations
would be incapable of litigating in their own right.
34. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 20, at 1-6. To be fair, the authors also state that cor-
porate entities, including churches deserve exceptional treatment only with respect to
their distinctively religious activities. Id. at 4.
35.Id. at6.
36. See generally Hutchison, Metaphysical Univocity, supra note 20, at 34-60 (de-
scribing three types of secularity within the zeitgeist, which often fails to find that reli-
gion is credible given the onset of a secular age, a move that is coupled with the advent of
exclusive humanism and the immanent frame).
37. Rienzi, supra note 20, at 60.
38.Id.
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whether corporate personhood, as an attribute, is sufficient to sustain or
preclude employers' religious liberty claims, either within the meaning
of the Constitution or within the textual parameters of RFRA,39 goes to
the heart of Hobby Lobby and forges a pathway to resolve future contro-
versies. Additionally, the solution to this riddle answers a related ques-
tion: whether sole proprietorships or other business organizations such
as general partnerships or nonprofits that apparently enjoy undisputed
free exercise rights can be distinguished in principle from for-profit cor-
porations, who do not.40 This Article is sparked by commentators, in-
cluding Justices of the Supreme Court4 and the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services,42 who puzzlingly confine their
opposition to free exercise rights to for-profit corporate employers as op-
posed to nonprofits or other entities, thus raising the question of whether
there is some corporate law principle, theory of the firm, business policy,
or constitutional provision that necessarily disfavors for-profit corpora-
tions.
Part I supplies a sketch of Gans's claims. Part II provides back-
ground by first considering the evolving history and meaning of the cor-
porate entity coupled with the emergence of separation of ownership and
control as a defining attribute; second, by placing the corporate rights
wrangle in the context of entrepreneurial choice; and finally, by referenc-
ing the fiery academic debate regarding corporate constitutional and stat-
utory rights. Although the weight of current corporate rights scholarship
places renewed emphasis on the "legal separateness" of the corporate
form as a dispositive attribute, Part II critiques this approach by evaluat-
ing Professor Garrett's comprehensive contribution to the literature as a
prelude to explicating the potential shortcomings of Gans's exposition of
corporate rights. Part III develops a framework for analyzing Gans's
claims. Part IV offers analysis and answers the crucial question: wheth-
er the assertion of religious liberty rights by employers ought to be re-
served for those who manifest themselves as mythical beings, natural
39. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 13-41 (examining,in Chapter 2 of their
book,the claim at the heart of Hobby Lobby: Do corporation have a right to exercise reli-
gion?).
40. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794 n.13
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (implicitly accepting the claim that for-profit sole proprietor-
ships enjoy Free Exercise rights while disputing such rights for for-profit corporations in
the context of a discussion of Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc.,
366 U.S. 617 (1961)).
41. See, e.g., id. at 2796-97 (stating that for-profit corporations are different from re-
ligious non-profits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate reli-
gious values shared by a community of believers).
42. Id. at 2769 (citing Brief for HHS at 17 (No. 13-354); Reply Brief at 7-8 (No. 13-
354) wherein the HHS concedes that a nonprofit corporation can be a "person" within the
meaning of RFRA).
2015]
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persons, or corporations. Cognizant of the fact that RFRA protection is
not absolute,43 this Article is not about who ought to prevail in Hobby
Lobby. Instead, this Article concentrates much of its attention on which
employers ought to have the right to bring a free exercise claim largely
within the boundaries of RFRA while being mindful of constitutional
paramaters and without relying fully on the Dictionary Act,44 which en-
ables courts to determine the meaning of any statute.45 Contrary to
Gans's analysis, this Article shows that there are few, if any, reasons that
can be derived from a robust theory of the firm for discriminating against
corporate employers regarding their ability to qualify for RFRA exemp-
tions on the basis of their organizational form.
II. GANS'S THESIS
Gans's exposition originates with an examination of two questions:
(1) whether corporations have the same religious freedom rights under
the First Amendment as individuals; and (2) whether the mandate in the
ACA that requires for-profit corporations to provide contraceptive cover-
age-although it makes an exception for some religious institutions-
violates both the First Amendment and also the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act. 46 Gans's interrogation was followed by other inquiries re-
garding whether corporations can or have the right to exercise a religion
as well as an investigation of the scope of corporate constitutional and
statutory rights.47 Later, Gans explains and critiques the oral arguments
by the parties and evaluates the implications of the Court's decision in
Hobby Lobby.
4
To answer the initial questions presented, Gans directs readers' at-
tention to the following observation: the introduction to the Constitution
indicates that the document "was written for the benefit of 'We the Peo-
ple of the United States.' 49 Gans intuits that during the Founding era,
corporations stood on an entirely different footing than natural persons.
Prompted by Justice John Marshall's early nineteenth century observa-
tion that a corporation is simply "an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in the contemplation of the law," 50 Gans reasons that a
corporation is simply a creature of the law that merely possesses the
properties, which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly
43. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 273.
44. Dictionary Act' 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
45. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
46. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 7 (Gans).
47. Id. at 14-17.
48. Id. at 63-65.
49.Id. at 7.
50. Kharas v. Barron C. Collier, Inc., 157 N.Y.S. 410,411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916).
[Vol. 120:2
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or incidentally.5 Citing James Madison's claim that "[a] charter of in-
corporation ... creates an artificial person not existing in law," Gans's
overall perspective reflects a concessionary/artificial entity model of cor-
porations,52 a view that lays the groundwork for substantial corporate
regulation by the government 3 His opposition to religious liberty rights
for for-profit corporations is tightly attached to the belief that "[t]he
Framers rooted the free exercise right in fundamentally human attrib-
utes-reason, conviction, and conscience-that make little sense as ap-
plied to corporations.,54 Gans asserts that, at the time of our nation's
founding, "corporations, unlike the individual citizens that made up the
nation, did not have fundamental and inalienable rights by virtue of their
inherent dignity.55
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that modern corporations today
have important constitutional rights, some of which-apparently tied to
matters of property and commerce-prevent corporate property from be-
ing taken without compensation.6 Corporations retain constitutional
rights to enter into contracts and, in addition, can only be proceeded
against under due process of law.57 Corporations also retain rights under
the Free Speech Clause.8 But without thoroughly explaining why corpo-
rate personhood gives rise to certain rights or why the absence of inher-
ent dignity precludes others, Gans revisits his foundational claim that
"since the Founding, corporations have been treated differently than in-
dividuals... [with regard] to certain fundamental, personal rights, and
the Constitution's guarantees cannot be applied wholesale to corpora-
tions."59 Gans explains that the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment's
right against self-incrimination to "business corporations because the
Fifth Amendment right 'is an explicit right of a natural person, protecting
51. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 8 (Gans).
52. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 20, at 3, 10-11 (explaining that when courts con-
clude that a regulation is valid, they often emphasize the "artificial" nature of corpora-
tions that on this account come into being only by virtue of the state's affirmative charter
or the state's concession and accordingly the law need not look upon it as upon a natural
person). See also Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO.
MASON U. L. REv. 99, 100 (1989) (showing that if either the artificial entity or conces-
sionary theory is accepted, it may provide a basis for state regulation). Gans's approach
presumes the validity of corporate regulations premised on the view that corporations are
simply artificial entities thus enabling the state to regulate them in a way it could not reg-
ulate natural persons. See GANS & SHAPIRo, supra note 2, at 8 (Gans).
53. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 8 (Gans).
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the realm of human thought and expression.' ' '6 Echoing the Obama ad-
ministration's contentions61 and reflecting the weight of scholarly opin-
ion,62 Gans insists that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion
because they lack human attributes.63  He maintains this view despite:
(1) his later admission that business owners have the right to pursue Free
Exercise Clause protection even though the pursuit of accommodation, in
a given case, cannot justify a religious exemption that undermines the
government's regulatory interest64 and (2) his persistent failure to note
that, when people get together in corporate form to establish churches,
synagogues and mosques, the formation of such entities and their corre-
sponding absence of human attributes (inherent dignity) does not pre-
clude the defense of the free exercise rights of these institutions.
After the moderator observed during oral arguments that Chief Jus-
tice Roberts might favor a narrow ruling upholding the free exercise
rights of closely held firms under RFRA rather than under the First
Amendment, Gans reproved this option because it would both fundamen-
tally revise free exercise law and imply that the rights of affected em-
ployees do not count.65 Hence, the procurement of Justice Roberts's op-
tion would extinguish employee access to contraceptives and enable
"secular, for-profit corporations ... to impose their religious beliefs on
their employees.66 Targeting RFRA, Gans states that this statute was
designed to restore the balanced jurisprudence that characterized free ex-
ercise law from 1963 (Sherbert v. Verner)67 until 1990 (Employment Di-
vision v. Smith).68 Rather than elaborate on this contention, however,
Gans opines that a Supreme Court decision favoring the employers in
Hobby Lobby would indicate that the "rights of employees don't count,"
thus facilitating extensive efforts by corporate employers to destroy
rights otherwise found within the ACA.6 9
60. Id.
61. Brief for Petitioners at 15-22, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct.
2751 (Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-354) (suggesting the Obama administration argued that for
various reasons the Hobby Lobby entities did not qualify as a RFRA "person").
62. Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 2-3, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354) (Jan. 28, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Law Professors' Brief] (claiming that the term "person" does not include for-profit
corporations).
63. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 14 (contending that free-exercise protects hu-
man attributes including human dignity (Gans)).
64.Id. at 38.
65. Id. at 47.
66. Id. at 48.
67. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
68. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
69. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 50-5 1. For a similar perspective, see also,
Leo. E. Strine, Jr., A job is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism
and its Problematic Implications 41 J. OF CORP. L. 71 (2015). But see Harry G.
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Responding to the Hobby Lobby opinion itself, Gans found the deci-
sion to be highly objectionable. First, the decision represents the first
time in history that the Court ruled that a corporation has religious free
exercise rights.70 Second, Gans was disturbed because, "for the first time
in history, the Court ruled that a secular for-profit corporation is entitled
to a religious exemption from general business regulation protecting the
rights of employees.' Third, "[t]he ruling confers on corporations the
right to trump and effectively extinguish the rights of its employees.72
Thus appreciated, Hobby Lobby opens "the floodgates to a host of new
claims for religious exemptions under RFRA.'7 Fourth, he contests Jus-
tice Alito's reasoning. Gans, objected specifically to the Court's ac-
ceptance of the notion that a corporation is merely an organization used
by natural persons to achieve desired ends, and accordingly, the firm
must be protected in order to defend "the liberty of humans who own and
control the companies.74  Such a notion, according to Gans, poses a
clear and present danger to the nation in the sense that it lays the founda-
tion for the Court to provide additional rights to corporations in the fu-
ture.75 This is so because the Court did not simply restore pre-Smith
free-exercise law but fundamentally altered it.
76 Finally, citing cases,77
Gans argues that Hobby Lobby is part of a larger trend toward recogniz-
ing the First Amendment rights of corporations, which thus empowers
firms to attack government regulation.
78
Reflecting his intuition that the corporate form is decisive at its
core, Gans's submission is triggered by alarm that artificial entities
would become too powerful as a compliant Supreme Court ignores the
wisdom of the Framers.79 On his account, the Court's rulings in Citizens
United,80 Hobby Lobby, and other cases discarded decisive aspects of the
Constitution's text and the nation's history while disregarding the
Founders' decision to exclude corporations from their account of 'We the
Hutchison, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law and Unsustainable Liberalism: A Reply to
Judge Strine, (forthcoming) 39 HARv. J. OF L. AND PUB. POLICY (2016).
70. Id. at 56-57.
71.Id. at 57.
72. Id. at 57, 64.
73. Id. at 57.
74. Id. at 57 (internal quotations omitted).
75.Id.
76. Id. at 57-58.
77. Id. at 67 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(referring to campaign finance); Sorell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) (mak-
ing it easier for corporations to challenge regulations of advertising and other forms of
commercial speech)).
78.Id.
79. Id. at 72.
80. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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People.'81 Thus fathomed, the extension of rights to corporations is a ru-
inous development for the nation,82 as turgid corporations are unleashed
to dominate the lives of natural persons, apparently in contravention of
Justice John Marshall's richly historical view of corporations. Gans ad-
vances his parade of horribles by stating that Citizens United held that
corporations may use special privileges that they alone possess to spend
vast amounts of money to elect candidates willing to act on their behest,
and by reiterating the claim that Hobby Lobby gives owners of closely
held firms the opportunity to foist their religious beliefs and prevent
workers from exercising important federal rights.8 3 Finally, Gans deduc-
es that the Roberts Court is committed to altering the essential rules of
government in order to advance corporate dominance,84 a development
that facilitates the transmutation of corporations into instruments of dis-
crimination without any logical stopping point.85
III. CORPORATE RIGHTS AND CORPORATE "SEPARATENESS" IN THE
DOCK?
A. Introduction
Gans rightly notes that Hobby Lobby generates numerous issues in-
cluding whether corporations have either Article III or third-party stand-
ing.86 Regardless of whether the Supreme Court has ever based its cor-
porate rights jurisprudence on the notion that a corporation is a person in
its own right,87 any comprehensive examination of standing implies that
the corporate rights debate pivots largely on the decisiveness of the cor-




85. Id. at 27-28.
86. For a comprehensive discussion of third-party standing, see Garrett, supra note
20, at 147-53. Garrett states that the Supreme Court has articulated the following test for
third-party standing purposes: "'Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to
vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party,' but a third party has standing
when there is (1) some injury to the party litigating the right, (2) a close relationship to
the nonparty whose rights are directly being litigated, and (3) some obstacle to that non-
party litigating, such that fundamental rights might otherwise go unprotected." Id. at
147-48 (citations omitted).
87. Blair & Pollman, supra note 30, at 1678 (asserting that early case law shows that
the "Court has never based its corporate rights jurisprudence on the idea that a corpora-
tion is a constitutionally protected 'person' in its own right"). But see, Meese & Oman,
supra note 20, at 287-88 (noting that the "Supreme Court unanimously recognized over a
century ago: 'Under the designation of 'person' there is no doubt that a private corpora-
tion is included. Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a
special purpose and permitted to do business under a particular name and have a succes-
sion of members without dissolution"').
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porate form itself88 Whether corporate "separateness," separation of
ownership and control, limited liability, and profit-maximization are at-
tributes that ought to categorically inform the corporate rights debate, the
novel question before the Hobby Lobby Court was whether business cor-
porations, like Conestoga Wood, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel, have Free
Exercise rights protectable under the Constitution or RFRA.9 It has
been argued that in order to sustain their claims, the respective corporate
plaintiffs had to appropriate the religious beliefs of the owners thus dis-
regarding the company's personhood.90 Irrespective of the truth or falsi-
ty of this claim, as we have previously seen, the Court, in reaching its
decision, found that nothing in RFRA indicates that Congress intended to
depart from the Dictionary Act's definition of persons, which includes
corporations, companies, associations, partnerships, and individuals.
91
The Court further observed that it had previously entertained free-
exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations.92 The Hobby Lobby
Court decided that neither the corporate status of the plaintiff-firms nor
their pursuit of a profit per se disqualified them from successfully lodg-
ing a free-exercise claim.93 Problems arise, however, because the Court
failed to offer a coherent explanation of its reasoning based on an exami-
nation of corporate theory either in this case or in its prior opinions.94
The Hobby Lobby decision, in combination with the Court's previ-
ous decisions in Citizens Uniteat5 (validating the First Amendment rights
of corporate entities despite vigorous opposition)
96 and Hosanna Tabor97
(exempting an ecclesiastical corporation from a generally applicable
statute),98 has spurred numerous questions regarding the constitutional
and statutory rights of corporations and other business entities.99 Pro-
88. See infra Parts II.B, ILC, and II.D.
89. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2769-73 (2014) (discussing whether
corporations may exercise free-exercise primarily within the meaning of RFRA but also
within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause and further explicating why RFRA did
more than codify the Supreme Court's pre-Smith Free Exercise precedents).
90. Kent Greenfield, In Defense ofCorporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309,
314 (2015).
91. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2768-69.
92. Id. at 2769.
93. Id. at 2769-72.
94. Buccola, supra note 20, at 2-4.
95. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010).
96. Id. at 426-29 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
98. Id. at 707 (finding that a ministerial exception in this case thus thwarting the
plaintiff's claim of discrimination).
99. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 20, at 2-3 (observing that a number of cases have
"reinvigorated a century-old academic debate about the nature of the firm" and "the at-
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voked by the Citizens United decision, for instance, many commentators
argue that "the Constitution does not protect nonprofit corporations, for-
profit corporations, or other business organizations because they are not
'real' people."100 Sparked by the unremarkable observation that there is
a distinction between natural and artificial persons, this contention en-
capsulates Justice Stevens's principle claim in Citizens United that the
corporate form is ripe for both regulation and restriction within the
meaning of the Constitution.'O This view effectively implies that corpo-
rations are quasi-public entities that deserve unique treatment coherent
with the claim that they are designed to serve a social function for the
state.02 It follows, therefore, that "when rights-bearing individuals pool
their economic ... ideological [or religious] resources to form a firm that
enters into [the stream of] commerce" via a contractual agreement, "their
constitutional rights do not necessarily remain intact for a variety of pub-
lic welfare reasons."
' 103
Building on this perception, one that reflects a mounting political
movement against corporate personhood,104 as well as the current spiritus
mundi exposed by the nation's capitulation to ambitious egalitarian-
ism,10 5 opponents of such rights emphasize the consequentialist claim
that exempting corporate employers from otherwise generally applicable
laws inflicts unjust burdens on "so-called 'third parties'-persons who
derive no benefit from an exemption because they do not believe or en-
gage in the exempted religious practices."10 6 Whether or not burdens can
prevent corporations from lodging free-exercise claims, Hobby Lobby
has launched an ever-widening gyre mainly designed to vitiate the eligi-
bility of for-profit corporation for exemptions from generally applicable
law.10 7  Stressing the notion of corporate "separateness"- meaning,
tribution of rights to corporations including the source as well as the content and limits of
such rights").
100. Harry G. Hutchison, Ampersand, Tornillo, and Citizens United: The First
Amendment, Corporate Speech, and the NLRB, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 630, 676 (2014)
(citing the literature).
101. Citizens United,558 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
102. Id.
103. Hutchison, supra note 100, at 636.
104. Greenfield, supra note 90, at 311.
105. See, e.g., STEVEN SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 138 (2014) [hereinafter STEVEN SMITH] (quoting Kahn on the intersection of the
nation's hyper pluralism with ambitious egalitarianism).
106. Gedicks & Tassell, supra note 20, at 1-18 (arguing that "[alt the time Hobby
Lobby was decided, the great weight of free-exercise and anti-establishment precedent
precluded religious exemptions that impose costs on third parties").
107. See, e.g., Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 2-3; Garrett, supra note 20,
at 102, 107 (contending that corporations lack the capacity to litigate on behalf of others
and hence cannot profit from an exemption from generally applicable law).
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among other things, that shareholders are not held liable for the debts of
the corporation' 8-opponents of this decision invoke the menacing spec-
ter of anthropomorphism insisting that the inability of corporations to
pray or physically engage in worship prevents such entities from success-
fully pursuing exemptions within the meaning of RFRA,109 although both
the Constitution and RFRA recognize the religious rights of natural per-
sons. Although the logic of this claim could apply equally to churches,
synagogues, and mosques as most are incorporated organizations or as-
sociations and thus cannot physically engage in worship, the Obama ad-
ministration has offered concessions (exemptions) to religious objectors
otherwise covered by the contraceptive mandate110 in spite of their corpo-
rate form as either ecclesiastical or nonprofit charitable corporations.
While it is doubtful that the administration's position on the legal sepa-
rateness of the corporate form or on other issues arising out of the ACA
can be seen as a model of consistency,"1 such concessions correlate with
the fact that religion and our nation's history have been closely inter-
twined.12 Within the context of the Free Exercise Clause, moreover, the
adjudicative record before the passage of RFRA indicates that the ability
108. Greenfield, supra note 90, at 314.
109. Holding that Conestoga, as a "secular, for-profit corporation," lacks RFRA pro-
tection, the Third Circuit wrote:
General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or
belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They
do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated
actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual
actors.
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev'd, 723 F.3d 1114, 1147
(10th Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2785 (2014)).
110. Garfield, supra note 20, at 2 (claiming that the Obama dministration has ex-
empted core religious institutions such as churches, synagogues, and mosques from com-
pliance with the mandate and has created a workaround for religious nonprofit institu-
tions enabling employees of these institutions to receive contraceptive care without their
employers having to pay for it).
111. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763-64 (observing that in addition to ex-
emptions for religious organizations, the "ACA exempts a great many employers from
most of its coverage requirements. Employers providing 'grandfathered health plans'-
those that existed prior to March 23, 2010, and that have not made specified changes after
that date-need not comply with many of the Act's requirements, including the contra-
ceptive mandate"). See also BETSY MCCAUGHEY, BEATING OBAMACARE 2014: AvOID
THE LANDMINES AND PROTECT YOUR HEALTH, INCOME, AND FREEDOM 46 (2014) (noting
that the Obama administration has issued more than 1400 waivers from ACA regulations
without statutory authority).
112. Rienzi, supra note 20, at 59.
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of businesses to pursue religious exemptions within the parameters of the
First Amendment did not depend on their profit making status, and this
observation remains lively regardless of whether such exemptions were
granted."3 Despite such history, spanning several decades, the possible
application of religious exemptions to for-profit corporations continues
to generate a barrage of scholarship.1 4 Gans's particular contribution to
the literature is examined in Part IV. Before we start the examination in
Part IV, however, it is useful to provide background on the basic princi-
ples of corporations; to place corporate rights analysis within the context
of entrepreneurial choice; to examine corporate rights within the context
of standing and the distinction, if any, between organizations and associ-
ations; and to develop a framework for analysis.
B. Background
Justice Brennan observed that "by 1871, it was well understood that
corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purpos-
es of constitutional and statutory analysis."'115 The Supreme Court, con-
sequently, has repeatedly held that for-profit corporations are constitu-
tional "persons."'1 16 The Dictionary Act, similarly, provides that, "unless
the context indicates otherwise ... the word 'person' . . . include[s] cor-
porations[,] ... partnerships[,] ... as well as individuals."'1 17 Such defi-
nition is "without regard to whether such firms or individuals are en-
gaged in profit seeking activities."'118 Though the language, "unless the
context indicates otherwise," fails to authorize judges to fashion optimal
definitions of "persons" on a statute-by-statute basis, many scholars and
the Obama administration assert that the term "person" does not include
for-profit corporations, even if the Hobby Lobby firms' shareholders are
the authentic source of religious exercise by the firms. 1 19 It follows that
the administration's approach would elevate .the dispositive force of cor-
porate personhood.120 The Obama administration's approach is grounded
in the richly historic notion that the basic principles of corporate law and
corporate personhood mandate and manifest an ontological division be-
113. Id. at 60. Rienzi states: "The Supreme Court has previously recognized reli-
gious liberty rights for people earning a living, including some business owners and the
Court has repeatedly recognized that the corporate form itself is not inherently incompat-
ible with religious exercise, at least in the context of nonprofit corporations." Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
114. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
115. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978).
116. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 275 n. 15 (citing a number of cases).
117. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
118. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 276.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part II.C for a fuller explanation of this claim.
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tween corporations and other business enterprises or nonprofit entities
because for-profit corporations enjoy an existence that is not necessarily
coterminous with their shareholders.
121
Undeniably, "[c]orporate personhood itself evolved in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries as a complex and powerful legal
concept."'' 22 Consistent with the evolutionary nature of the corporate
personhood doctrine,123 the separation of ownership and control of the
artificial vehicle known as a corporation surfaced as a strikingly essential
attribute of public corporations in the work of Berle and Means.124 This
development reflects observations that are more than 80 years old.
125
Separation of ownership and control, as an attribute, emerged in the nine-
teenth century and "facilitated the growth of large industrial corpora-
tions... [as part of an antique move] that created the potential for share-
holder and managerial interest to diverge.' 26  Berle and Means's
analysis, primarily confined to large publicly traded firms and the poten-
tial agency costs associated with dispersed shareholders who lack opera-
tional control, is grounded in the perception that investors could not nec-
essarily rely on the communicative proficiency of quidnuncs or on
unannounced visits by investors themselves to keep tabs on managers.
27
As popularized by Walter Lippman in the 1940s, Berle and Means' thesis
provided an explanation for the rise in concentrated economic power and
the State's consequent regulatory response to such power from the mid-
dle of the twentieth century onward.
28
It is worth noticing that the corporate form has a long history with
antecedents dating backing several centuries,129 even if this history does
not fully explain the concept of corporate identity premised on corporate
separateness.130 Coextensive with the emergence of chartered joint stock
companies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, elements of
121. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 276 (citing Law Professors' Brief, supra note
62, at 2-3).
122. Garrett, supra note 20, at 109.
123. See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATION LAW 3-4 (2012)
(describing the evolution of this doctrine for purposes of the assertion of constitutional
rights by corporate entities).
124. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-10 (2002)
[hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS].
125. Id.at 9.
126. Id. at 10.
127. David Franz, Pillar, Ledger, and Mission: Ontologies of the American Corpo-
ration, HEDGEHOG REV., 7, 8-9 (2009).
128. See, e.g., Alan Trachtenberg, Images, Inc.: Visual Domains of the Corporation,
HEDGEHOG REV. 19, 19 (2009) (quoting WALTER LIPPMAN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCI-
PLES OF THE GOOD SOCIETY 13 (1943)).
129. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 5.
130. See generally Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 20, at 1-40.
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the business corporation developed, including the transferability of
shares and limited liability."' The record suggests that until "a few cen-
turies ago, the privately owned, for-profit business corporation did not
exist"' 132 because before "the beginning of the nineteenth century, most
business and commerce was conducted by proprietorships and partner-
ships.,133 Defined in the eighteenth century, the corporation came to be
seen as "'a collection of many individuals united into one body,' has
'perpetual succession under an artificial form' and is 'vested by the poli-
cy of the law, with a capacity of acting, in several respects, as an indi-
vidual particularly of taking and granting property, contracting obliga-
tions, and of suing and being sued.',1 34  History confirms that
corporations could be ecclesiastical in nature, public, originating in coun-
ties, cities and towns, or private firms engaged in for-profit activity.135
Professor Garrett, for example, rightly notes that the underlying legal sta-
tus of the corporation and its interest is a function of state law. 136 "State
law defines the organizational requirements for being recognized as a
type of corporation or partnership, as well as the legal consequences of
such status.'' 137 A corporation may have a large group of shareholders
and separate management if it is a public corporation, or it may be a
large corporation with private owners, or it may have a small group of
owners consistent with the fact that the vast majority of corporations are
quite small.138 Moreover, it is likely that limited liability is not necessari-
ly a defining characteristic of corporations since limited liability partner-
ships and LLCs, which are unincorporated entities, enjoy limited liability
like corporations in contradistinction to the default rules that apply to
general partnerships or sole proprietorships.3 9 Emerging from this histo-
ry and regardless of veracity of this analysis, the idea that a corporation
may exercise constitutional rights is nothing new. 40 The next subsection
places this history within the context of entrepreneurial choice before di-
rectly confronting the renewed scholarly emphasis on "separateness" as a
defining attribute of a corporation.1
4 '
131. Id.
132. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1 (1986) (footnote omitted).
133. Id.
134. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 5 (citing 1 STEWART
KYD, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 2-4, 7, 10, 13 (1793)).
135. Id.
136. Garrett, supra note 20, at 105.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. But see Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 286 (showing that limited liabil-
ity can be an attribute of sole proprietorships as a result of bargaining).
140. Garrett, supra note 20, at 110.
141. See infra Part II.D.
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C. Placing Corporate Rights in the Context of Entrepreneurial Choice
Theories about he corporation and corporate rights hinge on per-
ceptions of what corporations look like or should look like.1 42 Law em-
bodies beliefs about what is legitimate, and beliefs influence decision
making behavior.143  Building something is arguably "a willful act of
symbolic import, sometimes intended, sometimes not."'144 Building high-
rise structures, human settlements, or corporations demands the capabil-
,,145ity to bring such vehicles "into being and sustain them over time, a
move that ultimately reflects the scope of intentional human choices
available. Doubts emerge when the various entities and structures that
result from the instantiation of human choice are said to represent "legit-
imate authority" based on morality "'more than' mere power, more than
the human capacity to will something and make it So.' 14 6 Beyond occu-
pying the contestable domain of corporate social responsibility advocacy
and its corresponding social activism,147 the question of moral authority
inflames the debate regarding the First Amendment and free-exercise
rights of corporations or other for-profit vehicles. 148 In our contemporary
epoch, nowhere is the legitimate authority of firms more in doubt than in
the domain of corporate-rights adjudication.149  This debate is further
muddled in virtue of the fact that the scholarly literature identifies three
conflicting approaches for evaluating for-profit corporations.50
142. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation 1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 243 (1990).
143. Id.
144. Philip Bess, Building on Truth: An Argument for a Return to Metaphysical Re-




147. See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Hobby Lobby and Social Justice: How the
Supreme Court Opened the Door for Socially Conscious Investors, 68 SMU L. REV. 243,
243-44 (2015) (asserting that after Hobby Lobby corporations can be moral persons that
do not need to maximize shareholder wealth).
148. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (attacking the Court's decision to hold that "commercial enterprises,
including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships can opt out of
any law ... they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs" and that
"[c]ompelling governmental interests in uniform compliance with the law, and the disad-
vantages that religion-based opt-outs impose on others, hold no sway").
149. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 20, at 110-56 (contesting the legitimacy of corpo-
rate rights).
150. Buccola, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that the three tropes include: (1) an "ag-
gregate" theory, which emphasizes the contractual aspect of the corporation, (2) a "real
entity" theory, which posits an autonomous entity distinct from natural persons, and (3)
an "artificial entity" or "concession" theory, which implies that the corporation owes its
existence to the state's largesse).
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Prompted by the Court's recent decisions in Hobby Lobby and Citi-
zens United, corporate ontology is all the rage, and this rage arguably re-
flects more than a century of decision making. To be sure, contemporary
cases have provoked a savage academic debate about the nature of the
firm, a roiling tempest that is compounded by the public's reaction.
151
This current wrangle advances questions "about the attribution of rights
to corporations, including the source as well as the content, and limits of
such rights."'152 There is a vanishingly small probability that such ques-
tions will disappear because the Court, throughout its history, "has ar-
ticulated inconsistent and mutually incompatible theories of the corpora-
tion" '153 and because the Justices have looked to several different theories
of the firm that yield predictably unpredictable judgments regarding the
existence of corporate rights.54 Correspondingly, the Court has refused
to proffer a general theory of corporate constitutional rights155 and to en-
gage in a sustained effort to develop a coherent or comprehensible test
for ascertaining the rights that corporations hold.156 Likewise, the Court
has abstained from defining a corporation or organization as a prelude to
building a cohesive theory of corporate rights adjudication.157 As a con-
sequence, scholars have attempted to fill this void by debating how best
to define corporate rights for over a century.'58
Countering this jurisprudential void, commentators repeatedly ad-
vert to the observation that the text of the Constitution fails to mention
corporations159 or, alternatively-as more fully developed in Subsection
D-place renewed emphasis on the notion of corporate "separateness.16°
The absence of textual language gives rise to interpretation issues that
are compounded by the willingness of some commentators to rely on his-
torically accurate but antiquated conceptions of the firm.'6' Corporations
are best understood as one type of organization-there are others-that
reflects a conglomeration of people who possess legal rights in the first
place, rather than anachronistic entities surfacing from the grant of mo-
nopoly power like the British East India Company during the Founding
era, or like Fannie Mae or the U.S. Postal Service in our current era.162 It
151. Id. at 2-3.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Garrett, supra note 20, at 98.
156. Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REv. 27, 32
(2014) [hereinafter Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy].
157. Garrett, supra note 20, at 108.
158. Id.
159. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 6.
160. See infra Part II.D.
161. See generally supra Part II.B.
162. GANs & SHAPiRo, supra note 2, at 15-16 (contesting Gans's claims (Shapiro)).
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is likely that corporations during the Founding era bear little relationship
to the modem corporation that originates out of the entrepreneurial-
choice-nexus-of-contracts paradigm or the much celebrated Berle and
Means framework. The status of current adjudicatory norms within the
realm of corporate law prompts scholars to question whether corporate
theory in the form of a metaphysical inquisition provides a basis for
courts to ascertain whether corporations are the kinds of beings that can
or should have rights, or instead, proffer a realist appraisal that looks at
society's interests and the functional relations involved. 1
63
Given the Supreme Court's undulating record, Professor Stephen
Bainbridge posits that it is a mistake to suppose that the Court's recent
efforts to fashion a comprehendible corporate personhood doctrine
amounts to more than an exercise in incoherence.164 Though such claims
are well-founded, Professor Vincent Buccola maintains, that, though "the
Justices have invoked... various conceptions of the firm in the course of
their many opinions, the body of the Court's corporate-rights jurispru-
dence, taken as a whole, can be understood to reflect to a surprising de-
gree the contractarian premises of transaction-and agency-costs econom-
ics. ' 165 In spite of the ad hoc nature of corporate-rights adjudication,
nearly all of the Court's decisions are consistent with the goal of ensur-
ing that its legal rules have a non-distortive and, therefore, neutral effect
on the organizational form chosen by venturers'66 From this standpoint,
it is possible to see that the Court's approach to corporate rights is
grounded in the presupposition that "regulatory burdens ought to attach
to cooperative activity in virtue of the activity's substance, not the mode
through which entrepreneurs choose to coordinate."'167 Whether or not
the Court ever intended to invoke this presumption in the first place, en-
trepreneurs, cognizant of transaction-and agency-cost economics within a
competitive realm, choose to economize on the social costs of produc-
tion.161
As more fully explained in Part III, the Court advances this entre-
preneurial-choice-proposition by "ascrib[ing] rights to corporations so as
not to bias decisions about either the scope or mode of productive inte-
163. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 6.
164. Stephen Bainbridge, Taub asks "Is Hobby Lobby a Tool for Limiting Corporate
Constitutional Rights?" PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 12, 2015),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/06/taub-asks-is-
hobby-lobby-a-tool-for-limiting-corporate-constitutional-rights.html
165. Buccola, supra note 20, at 6.
166. Id. at 14. See also Butler, supra note 52, at 104 (showing that a sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, or corporation is equally conceivable).
167. Buccola, supra note 20, at 14.
168. Id. at 15 (offering an efficiency justification in order to advance the theory of
organizational neutrality as a decisional principle for determining corporate rights).
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gration" chosen by the firm. 169 Consistent with this disguised yet orderly
paradigm, profit pursuing entrepreneurs, as potential employers, choose a
specific form of organization based on the observation that the partner-
ship, limited partnership, business trust, LLC, sole proprietorship, con-
sumer cooperative, or corporation could "be optimal, depending on a
range of factors including ... the capital-intensity of the industry, the en-
terprise's scale, and the idiosyncratic personalities of the venturers.17°
Reflecting Professors Alchian and Demsetz's rich insights derived from
economic analysis, the firm (whatever its ultimate form), the size (the
degree of integration), or the legal type (the mode of integration) is a re-
sponse to the benefit of team production and the desire to drive costs
lower.
1 71
The development of the modem theory of the firm "provides the
theoretical basis for the contractual theory of the corporation," facilitat-
ing its formation for any lawful purpose, a move that "would not have
been possible without the development and empirical verification of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.,172 Originating out of a custom-
ized "nexus of contracts" that is arranged to advance firm goals and to
restrain the behavior of participants,1 73 this process is particularly useful
for large publicly-traded firms and easily adaptable for others and ex-
plains why a particular form of business organization is utilized by spe-
cific entrepreneurs. 174 The emergence of customized corporations, prem-
ised largely on Coasean economics and related insights arising from the
nature of the firm, 175 provide a sturdy platform to question the normative
implications of the previously ascendant, and still resilient, separation of
ownership and control thesis popularized by Berle and Means.
176
Though Berle and Means's thesis sustains one of the nation's most pow-
erful tropes-the possibility that large and oppressive corporations, unre-
strained by shareholders, run roughshod over both national and individu-
al interests-classical economics, in stark contrast, assumes that firms
169. Id. at 20.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Id. at 16-17.
172. Butler, supra note 52, at 106.
173. Id. at 105.
174. See generally id at 99-103.
175. Buccola shows that the study of transaction-cost economics arguably com-
menced with the publication of Ronald Coase's 1937 article on the nature of the firm.
Buccola, supra note 20, at 15-16. See also R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECo-
NOMICA 386 (1937); Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate
Law: A Reply to Greenfield, 37 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 437, 445-48 (2010) [hereinafter
Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law].
176. Butler, supra note 52, at 101-02 (explaining the applicability of the Berle &
Means thesis to large publicly traded corporations and disputing its resulting emphasis on
the need for greater state regulation that preempts private ordering).
[Vol. 120:2
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FOR EMPLOYERS
frequently unite ownership and control, thereby concentrating decision-
making authority and economic consequence in the same hands.7 7 Uni-
fication challenges the Berle and Means's framework and implies that
the notion of passive shareholders responding to centralized management
may be more myth than reality, an observation that applies particularly to
closely held firms irrespective of firm size.
178
But before proceeding, it is worth noting that state law (with regard
to for-profit firms) is designed to encourage investment179 and establishes
the essential default rules that help to shape a corporation.180 Although a
firm's separate legal identity develops out of specified default rules,8'
these rules are frequently altered in combination with the goals, objec-
tives, and beliefs of private actors who shape the entity within the con-
fines of rational choice as part of the nexus of contracts paradigm. 82 The
fusion of modified default rules and corresponding goals and objectives
of the entrepreneurial group within the context of the contractarian model
has the power to create an officially separate legal personality that opera-
tionally takes on a variety of forms.18 3 It follows that, whatever forms
this fusion takes, the firm's separate legal personality reflects a plethora
of decisions that answer salient questions, which include the type of
business to operate, the most operationally efficient employment struc-
ture, and the optimal capital structure and governance mechanisms a  the
incorporators proceed to build something of value. 84 Entrepreneurial
decision making, emerging from a largely voluntary-mutual-benefit set-
ting, is propelled by the group's goals, objectives, and intentions, as well
as their time horizon.185 This process that may give rise to corporations
177. See, e.g., Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 280.
178. Id. at 280-81.
179. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 5-6.
180. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 124, at
14-16, 29-31 (discussing state law and the source of default rules that emerges from the
choice made by members of the entrepreneurial group).
181. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 5.
182. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 124, at
23-31 (discussing rational choice and showing that a corporation arises as a nexus of
contracts).
183. Id. at 29-31 (showing how voluntary contracts and the choice of default rules
gives rise to a commercial entity that reflects the choices the parties make). See also
Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 280-85 (describing the various ways that the incorpo-
rators can choose to operate a corporation, including devices that enable corporations to
look very much like partnerships).
184. Buccola, supra note 20, at 17 (discussing optimal structure within a contractar-
ian setting that depends on a number of factors including, for example, the capital-
intensity of the industry, the enterprise's scale, and the idiosyncratic personalities of the
venturers).
185. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law, supra note 175, at
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that are profoundly different in operation than the delineation that surfac-
es from Berle and Means's singular focus on the separation of ownership
and control that characterizes large publicly-held firms managed by en-
trenched managers because no one shareholder or group of shareholders
acting together own sufficient stock to claim control.186 Hence, for many
firms, the notion of a "separate legal personality" associated with a cor-
porate employer does not necessarily imply any separation between the
entrepreneurial group's goals and objectives and the goals and objectives
of a for-profit corporation itself.187 The absence of operational separa-
tion corresponds with classical economics, which assumes that for-profit
firms frequently unite ownership and control, thereby "concentrating de-
cision-making authority and economic consequences in the same
hands,'188 a move that mirrors the operation of a sole proprietorship or a
partnership.
189
Congruent with the contractual and variable nature of corporate law,
shareholders, within the parameters of a customized firm, are capable of
exercising the ordinary prerogatives of business ownership themselves. 190
As an empirical matter, it is questionable whether any "essence of corpo-
rateness.... [in practical terms,] precludes shareholders with such pre-
rogatives [in mind] from employing for-profit corporations to exercise
their religion."'191 Corporations whose owners impose their personal reli-
gious beliefs on the firm are commonplace because investors can alter
default rules that contradict the essentialist version of the for-profit
firm,' 92 which holds many scholars captive.193  Since entrepreneurs
choose from a variety of organizational forms, and since they can also
choose to modify default rules governing the internal operations of a
firm, this convergence of inchoate choices has implications for any unbi-
ased enquiry into the constitutional or statutory rights of the firm.19 4 It
follows that doubts arise regarding the contention that a corporation au-
tomatically forfeits free-exercise protection when it organizes itself in
186. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 124, at 10.
187. Meese & Oman, supra note 20,at 282-83 (showing that in some corporations,
directors and shareholders are often one and the same).
188. Id. at 280.
189. Id. at 280-84 (showing how some firms replicate the ownership and manage-
ment structure of a partnership),
190. Id. at 274.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 279-80.
193. See generally, e.g., Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62.
194. See generally Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 279-301.
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this form, as opposed to organizing itself as a sole proprietorship or part-
nership.1
95
Buccola and other scholars, despite the Supreme Court's failure to
clarify the extent of a for-profit corporation's legal entitlements as op-
posed to the legal entitlements of ecclesiastical corporations, nonprofits,
and sole proprietorships,196 and in contrast with the weight of scholarly
opinion, stress the contractarian, entrepreneurial-choice foundations of
the corporation and the Court's implicit commitment to decision-making
and rule-making that is grounded in non-distortive legal rules that have a
neutral effect on the organizational form chosen by venturers.97 This
analysis disputes the contemporary application of the Berle and Means'
thesis as the primary basis for any discussion of corporate rights and sub-
stitutes entrepreneurial choice within a customized nexus-of-contracts
framework for a viewpoint that depends on the idea of a widely dispersed
shareholder group whose power is diminished by collective action prob-
lems.198 But even if Buccola's insights are correct, for them to be sus-
tained within the domain of corporate free-exercise rights, they must
withstand the energetic efforts of many contemporary scholars engaged
in renewed attempts to ground their opposition to corporate rights within
the notion of corporate separateness, the concept of limited liability, and
the allegedly dispositive distinction between organizations and associa-
tions. The next subsection examines this weighty effort that is calibrated
to resurrect Berle and Means's thesis as impassable impediment to cor-
porate rights.
195. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (rejecting
the claim that "the owners of the companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they de-
cided to organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole proprietorships").
196. Buccola, supra note 20, at 3. See also Garrett, supra note 20, at 98 (noting that
the Supreme Court has not offered a general theory defining the constitutional rights of
corporations).
197. Buccola, supra note 20, at 17.
198. For a discussion of dispersed ownership and the avoidance of chaos that would
come from vesting power in the hand of widely dispersed shareholders, within the con-
text of the Berle & Means paradigm, see BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOM-
ics, supra note 124, at 10.
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D. The Second Coming of "Separateness" on the Road to Hobby
Lobby?
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,....
Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.199
Despite Justice Brennan's observation that by 1871, it was well un-
derstood that for-profit corporations should be treated as natural persons
for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis, and de-
spite the existence of the entrepreneurial-choice paradigm that disputes
the applicability of Berle and Means's analysis with respect to many cor-
porations, the subject of corporate rights remains vast. Responding to
the vastness, a number of contemporary scholars,200 including Professor
Garrett, in particular, stress the separation of the firm and its sharehold-
ers as a dispositive attribute for purposes of corporate rights adjudica-
tion.20 ' Gans's contribution to the literature is part of this robust effort,
but Professor Garrett's analysis is arguably the deepest and, perhaps,
most comprehensive available20 2 since Berle and Means published theirs.
If Garrett's approach prevails as basis for constraining corporate rights,
then corporate "separateness" faces the prospect of an impending resur-
rection, an event that would signify that Gans's rejection of corporate
rights ought to withstand scrutiny. But if not, it becomes highly doubtful
that Gans's approach survives.
Sparked principally by the question of whether a corporation has
standing to litigate constitutional rights in federal courts, and echoing
claims made by leading scholars that corporations are distinct legal enti-
ties protected from intrusion by shareholders who enjoy limited liability
behind the corporate veil,20 3 Garrett initially affirms that for each consti-
tutional right the Court has considered, it "has adopted a consistent ap-
proach by largely avoiding questions concerning the inherent nature of
199. William B. Yeats, The Second Coming, POETRY FOUNDATION,
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/172062 (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
200. See, e.g., Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 1-13.
201. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 20, at 110-36.
202. For an example of other scholarly efforts see Law Professors' Brief, supra note
62, at 1-13.
203. Id. at 3-5 ("The first principle of corporate law is that for-profit corporations
are entities that possess legal interest and a legal identity of their own--one separate and
distinct from their shareholders.").
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different types of entities.,,204 "Instead, the Court focuses on the conse-
quences of finding that an organization has standing to assert the right by
examining the purposes of the particular constitutional right [to] decide if
entities have asserted a sufficient injury creating standing to litigate the
right., 20 5 At first blush, avoidance of questions regarding the inherent
nature of different types of entities appears to be congruent with the de-
duction that corporate personhood ought to be seen as immaterial, or
with Lupu and Tuttle's post-Hobby Lobby intuition, which disputes the
relevance of corporate identity within the domain of religious exemp-
206tions.
Garrett catalogues when an organization can litigate an injury to the
entity itself, which is viewed as a threshold question of Article III stand-
ing.20 7 Here, he returns to a familiar theme that invokes a panegyric of-
fered by Gans and a large number of scholars: the infrangibility and cen-
trality of corporate "separateness.20 8 He observes that the Court has
held that "a plaintiff must be able to show a cognizable injury in fact to
have a case or controversy that may be heard by Article III courts.
209
Though Article III standing may supply a useful scaffold on which to ex-
plicate whether an organization or association can litigate constitutional
rights,210 the Supreme Court gingerly avoided the question whether cor-
poration are persons with standing to assert constitutional rights in Citi-
zens United.a  In Hobby Lobby, the Court avoided the issue entirely by
relying on its understanding of statutory rights under RFRA.2 2
204. Garrett, supra note 20, at 110.
205. Id. at 110-11. Garrett examines the Contract Clause, the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Double Jeopardy Clause, the litigation of fines
under the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, and
claims under Structural provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 111-36.
206. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 20, at 6 (arguing that after Hobby Lobby, the focus
should be on the extent to which an organization and its activities are distinctively reli-
gious and that exemptions should irectly relate to the "distinctively religious qualities
the exemptions are designed to recognize and protect").
207. Garrett, supra note 20, at 136-56. Among other things, Garrett asserts that two
lines of cases are particularly crucial to the question of constitutional litigation by organi-
zation--one line of cases holds that organizations can raise constitutional rights by assert-
ing concrete injury to its own interests, but not those of others, and second, the Court
adopts a more flexible test for associations and membership organizations that permits
standing to assert the potentially broader interest of individual members. Id. at 137-47.
Additionally, he discusses third-party standing grounded in the Supreme Court's pruden-
tial or non-Article III third-party standing doctrine. Id. at 147-56.
208. Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 4.
209. Garrett, supra note 20, at 137.
210. Id. at 136-56.
211. Id. at 96.
212. Id. at 97. Avoidance of the standing issue may have been surprising given that
the issue of corporate standing was prominent in the confusion in the pre-Hobby Lobby
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Offering a narrowly drawn framework secured by the distinction be-
tween associations and organizations, Garrett postulates that the Supreme
Court's test for associational standing remains permissive and broad,
wherein the Court emphasizes the common interest of members and de-
scribes how the association is simply the medium through which individ-
ual members seek to make more effective the expression of their
views.2 13 Garrett maintains that there are "sound reasons for treating
nonprofit organizations and other types of organizations as associations,
[when and] if they, like membership organizations, represent the view-
points of individuals,,214 whereas for-profit corporations cannot represent
the interests of their members because of the centrality of their legal
structure.215 Hence, Garrett, among others,216 propounds the contention
that such organizations lack the ability to litigate injury to others217 in
contradistinction to an entity such as a sole proprietorship, which is
"nothing like a corporation; it is unincorporated, run by a single person,
and is not in any way separate from that single owner.,218 If this synop-
sis fairly exemplifies Garrett's scholarship, then, in tandem with the
weight of scholarly opinion, it signifies that corporate legal structure pre-
sents an impermeable barrier to corporate litigation on behalf of corpo-
rate free-exercise rights.219 Before determining whether such a conclu-
sion withstands examination, I next turn to Garrett's extensive
elaboration of organizational standing as opposed to associational stand-
ing wherein he stresses the debilities accompanying any attempt to ex-
pand corporate rights.
Garrett contends that "[o]rganizational standing analysis is quite
different from associational analysis. When an organization sues to as-
sert its own interests,... [such interests] are necessarily distinct from
those of its shareholders or owners.,,220 Thus appreciated, "the Article III
lower court rulings concerning challenges to the ACA's contraception mandate. Id. at
140.
213. Id. at 137-39.
214. Id. at 138.
215. Id. ("As a result, there may be sound reasons to treat nonprofit organizations
and other types of organizations as associations if they, like membership organizations,
represent he viewpoints of individuals. However, as discussed next, a for-profit corpora-
tion cannot do so given its legal structure and lacks the ability to litigate injury to oth-
ers.").
216. Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 10-16 (emphasizing the principle of
the separation between a corporation and its shareholders, a principle that deprives share-
holders of the ability to act on behalf of the corporation and likewise extirpating the right
of a corporation to sue to assert rights of their shareholders).
217. Garrett, supra note 20, at 138.
218. Id. at 143.
219. Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 13-18.
220. Garrett, supra note 20, at 139. But see Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 273-
74 (disputing this claim).
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inquiry proceeds by asking whether the entity itself suffered a 'concrete
injury' to its own interests, apart from any separately identified injury to
third parties, such as employees, officers, owners, or shareholders.221
Second, Garrett argues that "[n]ot only must the organization claim an
injury to the interests of the organization, but the particular harm that the
corporation suffers must also implicate or be caused by the violation of
the right being asserted by the entity., 222 On this view of the cathedral, a
corporation would be disqualified from bringing a free-exercise claim
when it does so in order to protect "the religious liberty of the humans
who own and control" it because allowing such litigation to enter the
courthouse door would "conflat[e] associational and organizational
standing, and ... assume[] that corporations and individuals[,] [who con-
stitute the firm,] ... have common 'beliefs' ... or financial interests.223
On this view, a non-profit corporation (e.g., church, synagogue or
mosque) can engage in religious exercise (apparently on associational
grounds) whereas a for-profit corporation "lacks the relevant free exer-
cise injury, since it lacks 'religious liberty' as a for-profit corporation."
224
There is much to untangle in such claims because they are not con-
stitutive of an auto-legitimating narrative.225 Suffice it to say that stress-
ing form over substance, and emphasizing clarity when the highly varia-
ble goals and objectives of entrepreneurs/organizers give rise to diverse
entities organized in widely different ways, Garrett insists that for a court
to indicate that "a for-profit company is no different than a non-profit or
an association or a religious entity... ignores the relevance of the corpo-
rate form entirely' 226 and "disregard[s] the fundamental feature of state
corporate law: separation of ownership from the entity.,22 7 Corpora-
tions, so the claim goes, are not entitled to litigate on behalf of owners'
personal interests, but rather must ensure litigation arises "out of a duty
to maximize corporate profits, returns to owners or shareholders[,] or
'other' corporate goals.228 In response to the questionable provenance
of such claims, one might ask a series of questions. First, what is the
source of the corporate duty to maximize profits within a nexus-of-
221. Garrett, supra note 20, at 139.
222. Id. at 140.
223. Id. at 145.
224. Id.
225. For a discussion of auto-legitimation, see, e.g., JAMES K. A. SMITH, WHO'S
AFRAID OF POSTMODERNISM? TAKING DERRIDA, LYOTARD AND FOUCAULT TO CHURCH 66
(2006) [hereinafter JAMES K. A. SMITH] (showing that the work of Jean-Frangois Lyotard
demonstrates that the notion of auto-legitimation arises within a narrative that arises out
of custom, homogeneity and therefore the authority of the claim is implicit in the narra-
tive itself).
226. Garrett, supra note 20, at 145.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 145-46.
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contracts-entrepreneurial-choice setting beyond the statements made by
the HHS,229 even if the prevailing default rule for publicly held firms re-
quires management o increase the value of shareholder wealth?230 Sec-
ond, is the pursuit of profits, standing alone (maximized or not) a cate-
gorically disqualifying attribute that eviscerates the free-exercise rights
of such corporations, when it is clear that a variety of other entities such
as unincorporated firms or nonprofits can pursue profits without suffer-
ing a diminution of their free-exercise rights? Finally, what is the con-
tent and scope of "other corporate goals" that Garrett finds worthy of
corporate rights litigation?
Considering each question in turn, the Hobby Lobby Court noted
that not all corporations that decline to organize as nonprofits do so in
order to maximize profit,231 an observation that tracks with the deduction
that profit maximization may lack fundamentality. Likewise, law and
economics scholarship shows that profit maximization far from existing
as legal principle is simply "[a] corollary of the self-interest assumption
for individual behavior,,232 a concept that implicates a large slew of eco-
nomic activity beyond the realm of for-profit corporations, assuming, of
course, that the managersof other entities respond rationally to incen-
tives. Further, despite Garrett's endeavor to define and constrain for-
profit corporations on the basis of their presumptively dispositive "sepa-
ration of ownership and control" attribute, this characteristic, even if tru-
ly representative of publicly held for-profit corporations, flies in the face
229. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014)
("HHS would draw a sharp line between nonprofit corporations (which, HHS concedes,
are protected by RFRA) and for-profit corporations (which HHS would leave unprotect-
ed), but the actual picture is less clear-cut). Not all corporations that decline to organize
as nonprofits do so in order to maximize profit. For example, organizations with religious
and charitable aims might organize as for-profit corporations because of the potential ad-
vantages of that corporate form, such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legisla-
tion or campaigning for political candidates who promote their religious or charitable
goals. In fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit
corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals, States have increasingly adopted laws formally
recognizing hybrid corporate forms. Over half of the States, for instance, now recognize
the "benefit corporation," a dual-purpose entity that seeks to achieve both a benefit for
the public and a profit for its owners."). (citations omitted).
230. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 124, at 28-29
(citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)).
231. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
232. HENRY N. BUTLER & CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR
LAWYERS 11 (2d ed. 2006); see also id. at 514 (offering a Glossary definition that ex-
plains the idea that "profit accrues only when the value of the good produced is greater
than the sum of the values of the ... resources utilized").
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of the possibility that the corporate form is of limited relevance for pur-
poses of assessing free-exercise rights. 33
Second, if the pursuit of profit is a disqualifying objective, then this
claim, when examined impartially, would implicate sole proprietorships
and unincorporated entities such as partnerships and LLCs, which,
whether they exclusively focus on maximizing profits or not, are just as
much the outcome of entrepreneurial choice as the establishment of a
for-profit corporation.234 Further, to the extent that the notion of profit in
combination with legal "separateness" sustains Garrett's objections to
corporate rights, it becomes important to note that a comprehensive un-
derstanding of economic theory enriched by the concepts of a "normal"
and "economic" profit provides a basis to dispute the possibility of draw-
ing a neat line that divides for-profit corporations from other institutions,
which humans create. Consistent with the possibility that opacity pre-
vails within the line-drawing arena of institutional rights, it is clear that
nonprofit corporations can pursue their free-exercise rights while simul-
taneously operating commercial enterprises that earn either a normal or
an economic profit.235 This prospect destabilizes Professor Garrett's in-
clination to permit nonprofits to bring free-exercise claims because they
are, or resemble, associations,2 36 but deny such rights to for-profit corpo-
rations because "legal separateness is the point of creating a [for-profit]
corporation.,237 Additional destabilizing evidence arrives by observing
233. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 20, at 6 (stressing that exemptions should depend on
the distinctively religious qualities the exemptions are designed to recognize rather than
whether entities have rights of religious exercise).
234. Rienzi, supra note 20, at 82 (showing that "[f]or nearly a century, scholars have
discussed the role of 'corporate social responsibility,"' consistent with the idea that "di-
rectors of a business corporation should not focus exclusively on [the pursuit of] profit"
but rather the "businesses should consider the impact of the business's actions on a varie-
ty of stakeholders, such as the company's employees, its customers, the community, or
the environment" and this idea extends to a variety of entities including partnerships,
"contractual joint venture[s], entity joint venture[s], or even ... loosely affiliated individ-
uals coming together in a temporary constellation for a particular project").
235. "Economic profit is defined as the total revenues received from selling a prod-
uct or service minus the total costs of producing the product or service, including the op-
portunity costs [of production]." BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 232, at 11. Thus un-
derstood, whether the firm is a for-profit or nonprofit entity, it arguably must cover all of
its cost including opportunity costs, or the costs of some foregone activity in producing
its goods or services. Opportunity costs reflects the fact that a firm, whether for-profit or
not, must attract inputs-resources or factors of production-from alternative uses. Id. at
15. In considering the costs of production, "economists and many courts are careful to
recognize both the explicit costs recorded in the firm's books and the implicit costs that
reflect the value of resources used in production by the firm for which no explicit pay-
ments [have been] made." Id. When and if a nonprofit takes in more revenue than its
total explicit and implicit costs, it earns an economic profit. See id. at 15-16.
236. Garrett, supra note 20, at 154.
237. ld. at 146.
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that, although the federal government statutorily distinguishes between
(tax-exempt) nonprofits and for-profit entities,238 it, nonetheless, allows
religious tax-exempt-nonprofits, such as churches, to earn a profit on
"unrelated income," a maneuver that does not pose a threat to such enti-
ties' free-exercise rights.239 Further, the possibility, if not the propensity,
of nonprofits to earn a profit can be advanced by scrutinizing Danish ev-
idence showing that when nonprofit foundations are used to control other
entities, they are on average as profitable as companies with convention-
al investor ownership.240 The foregoing analysis arguably renders much
of Garrett's presumed distinction between associations and organizations
moot for purposes of standing analysis.
Third, one could imagine that a principled understanding of "other
goals" would be capacious enough to encompass religious exercise even
if one is hindered by a precommitment to exclusive humanism, the im-
manent frame, and the secular age.241  At a minimum, "other goals"
could include ethical or moral objectives that are apparently rife in many
organizations, associations, and corporations. This possibility renders
virtually any attempt by scholars to cabin the institutional pursuit of reli-
gious exemptions in some binary fashion that presumptively excludes
corporations, highly suspect.
Instead of (1) offering a statutory rule requiring all corporations to
maximize profits-one that negates the live possibility of creating dual-
purpose, benefit or hybrid corporations,242 congruent with "the fact that []
rational choice [analysis] implicates the fulfillment of both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary wants 243-thus enabling actors to move beyond the max-
238. Rienzi, supra note 20, at 95 (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2012)).
239. Id. at 96.
240. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Steen Thomsen, Managerial Distance and Virtu-
al Ownership: The Governance of Industrial Foundations 4 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 372/2013, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=-2246116.
241. Hutchison, Metaphysical Univocity, supra note 20, at 40-44.
242. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
243. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law, supra note 175, at
439 (internal quotations omitted). As thus appreciated, a complete description of "human
rationality admits to a wider array of explanations for the choices human make." Harry
G. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues Dispute with
First Amendment Values, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1309, 1312 (2006). Rationality
does not necessarily succumb to John Stuart Mill's antinomian individualism wherein
flawed conceptions of autonomy and individuality combine with an obsessional enmity to
tradition and convention. See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 260 (1996). Rather, as Amartya Sen observes, rationality as activated within
the human actor signifies "the need to subject one's choices to the demands of reason[,]"
which encompasses more than simply maximizing one's self-interest to the exclusion of
other objectives. AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 4 (2002).
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imization of self-interest and the exclusion of other objectives;244 (2) en-
gaging with the notion of profit,245 in a robust way and applying it fairly
to both the domain of unincorporated for-profit organizations and non-
246thprofit entities, wherein the incentives for efficiency for nonprofits are
not necessarily weaker than for for-profit corporations;247 and (3) proffer-
ing a defendable definition of what "other goals" are constitutively suffi-
cient for purposes of sustaining corporate rights litigation, Garrett's sub-
mission is driven by the contention that "nothing [is] more fundamental
to modem corporate law than the complete separation of owners from the
legal entity itself.,248  However, much of this claim agrees with the
weight of scholarly opinion articulated by leading scholars,49 including
Gans, and though much of Justice Ginsburg's Hobby Lobby dissent pro-
motes his analysis, evidence shows that "corporations embodying share-
holders' religions are common, [and] pass[] without corporate law objec-
244. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 124, at
412 (showing that wealth maximization is often seen as a standard of conduct for direc-
tors but this norm "does not stand for the proposition that courts will closely supervise
the conduct of corporate directors to ensure that every decision maximizes shareholder
wealth"). See also id. at 23 (noting that "rational choice does not claim that humans are
driven solely by pecuniary incentives" but also arguing that "a rational actor's behavior is
completely determined by incentives[,]" whether pecuniary or not); SEN, supra note 243,
at 4. "[R]ationality is simply an abstraction developed as a useful model of predicting the
behavior of a large number of people-it does not purport to describe real people embed-
ded in a real social order". BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note
124, at 23.
245. From an economic perspective, profits are often defined on the basis of the val-
ue of all inputs and outputs at their opportunity costs. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH (International Student Edition) 332 (6th ed.
2003). Profits, correctly understood, as determined by accountants do not necessarily
accurately measure economic profits. Id. Thus when and if costs are accurately deter-
mined within the framework of economic profits, there is no apparent reason why a
"nonprofit" cannot earn and have the objective of earning an economic profit. For a dis-
cussion of profits and producer's surplus, see id. at 387-90. See also BUTLER &
DRAHOZAL, supra note 232, at 514 (offering a Glossary definition that explains the idea
that "profit accrues only when the value of the good produced is greater than the sum of
the values of the.., resources utilized").
246. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 9-10 (7th ed.
2007) (noting "that resources tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if volun-
tary exchange-a market-is permitted... [and accordingly] profit opportunity is noth-
ing more than "a magnet drawing resources into an activity").
247. See also id. at 422.
248. Garrett, supra note 20, at 146.
249. Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 3-5 (stating that "[t]he first principle
of corporate law is that for-profit corporations are entities that possess legal interests and
a legal identity of their own-one separate and distinct from their shareholders" and that
this principle applies regardless of whether the firm has one hundred or one million
shareholders and further opining that the "centrality of corporate 'separateness' is well-
established in the United States" and further asserting that "legal separateness is recog-
nized in every state including Oklahoma, the home of Hobby Lobby, and Pennsylvania,
the home of Conestoga [Wood]").
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tions"250 because of the nation's impressive religious diversity and cor-
porate law's enormous choice-reifying flexibility."'
As we have already seen, the "structure of corporate governance is
contingent and contractual, enabling shareholders of closely held corpo-
rations [and perhaps even large publicly-held firms,]2 12 to unify owner-
ship and control and exercise the same prerogatives as owners of non-
corporate businesses, such as partnerships.253 A proper contextual focus
signifies that Garrett's analysis, among others,254 indicates that "nothing
[is] more fundamental to modem corporate law than the complete separa-
tion of the owners from the legal entity"255 and that profit-maximization
overwhelms other values. Hence, if Garrett's analysis typifies scholarly
claims within the domain of corporate rights, it appears that the center
cannot hold potentially unleashing anarchy within the domain of corpo-
rate rights scholarship. This is so for two reasons: (1) because unifica-
tion of ownership and control, rather than operational separation, is pos-
sible and indeed is likely for many closely held corporations as well as
other firms; and (2) because many other entities that retain free-exercise
rights within the bounds of Garrett's analysis such as nonprofits or unin-
corporated entities (i.e., sole proprietorships, partnerships, LLPs, or
LLCs) are stained by both their pursuit and receipt of profit within the
commercial arena, while retaining both their status (if they ever held
such status) as artificial entities, and their free-exercise rights.
Predictably, despite Garrett's initial reification of the corporate
form and his elevation of corporate separateness-a maneuver which jus-
tifies his opposition to corporate rights on grounds that such organiza-
tions (corporations) are quite different from associations-Garrett con-
cedes that corporate ownership can combine with the legal entity in some
cases.256 This outcome is plausible, despite the likelihood that the sepa-
ration of ownership and control is the default rule for most publicly trad-
ed corporations257 in contradistinction to closely held ones. The unifica-
tion of ownership and control as a vehicle to advance the joint interests
of shareholders/managers within the domain of closely held firms fosters




254. Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 7-8 (supporting that claim that the le-
gal form of a corporation is dispositive). But see Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 280-
81.
255. Garrett, supra note 20, at 146.
256. Garrett, supra note 20, at 148 (conceding for purposes of third party standing
analysis that "[o]ne can imagine that an owner of a closely held corporation might be an
effective advocate for the corporation itself').
257. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values and Corporate Law, supra note 175, at
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the likelihood that such entities, just like membership organizations, can
more than adequately embody the viewpoints of individuals who estab-
258lish them since such entities function like associations. Consistent
with unification, most for-profit corporations file their tax returns as "S"
corporations, meaning that they "elect to pass corporate income, losses,
deductions and credits through to their shareholders for federal tax pur-
poses", just like partners in a partnership,259 as the federal government
declines to separate corporate owners of such firms from their business-
es. 26  Taken together, this analysis paves the way for most for-profit or-
ganizations (corporations) not only to represent the interest of their
members, but also to benefit from the Supreme Court's permissive and
broad test for associational standing without having its governance ar-
rangements closely scrutinized.261 Though some courts have held that
free-exercise claims are purely personal or, alternatively, that such
claims cannot be litigated by secular organizations, a number of lower
courts have decided that free-exercise claims can be asserted by organi-
zations on behalf of individuals, who can themselves exercise religious
practices on a derivative or third-party theory of prudential standing.262
The latter grouping of cases appears to track with the Supreme Court's
century-old claim that "[u]nder the designation of 'person' there is no
doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are mere-
ly associations of individuals united for a special purpose and permitted
to do business under a particular name and have a succession of members
without dissolution.,
263
Given this picture, the claim that for-profit status standing alone or
in conjunction with legal "separateness" is sufficient to disconnect for-
profit corporations from free-exercise rights merely because of their cho-
sen business form becomes doubtful. Corporate "separateness" reveals
itself as a rather indeterminate and frail instrument and its weakness is
intensified in virtue of the nimble observation that religious exercise may
take corporate form for a wide spectrum of actions and purposes, includ-
258. Garrett, supra note 20, at 137-38.
259. Rienzi, supra note 20, at 97.
260. Id. at 97-98.
261. Garrett, supra note 20, at 137-38. Despite the breath of Garrett's claims,
which evince the belief that a corporation ought to shorn of any connection with an asso-
ciation because such a linkage might facilitate the exercise of first amendment values, it
is possible that "the case law implies a deep and tractable logic." Buccola, supra note 20,
at 1 (observing that the case law supplies a corporate rights jurisprudence that reflects an
unstated principle of "organizational neutrality"). This observation, if true, supports the
conclusion that for-profit firms, at least in some cases, ought to be treated just like asso-
ciations for constitutional and statutory purposes.
262. Garrett, supra note 20, at 140.
263. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 287-88 (quoting Pembina Consol. Silver
Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 189 (1888)).
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ing: houses of worship, organizations that assert religious identities but
act in ways noticeably different from the typical functions of houses of
worship, and for-profit entities (corporate or otherwise) that claim reli-
gious identity.26 If true, going forward, the pertinent question may be
far less about which entities qua entity "have rights of religious exercise,
and far more about precisely what rights of religious exercise corporate
[and other] identities may legitimately assert.
265
Together, this examination shows that neither the attribute of corpo-
rate separateness nor for-profit status precludes corporations from exer-
cising free-exercise rights even though a complete answer to the question
of whether and when corporations enjoy, and ought to enjoy, constitu-
tional or statutory rights exceeds the scope of this enterprise. Nonethe-
less, because principled frameworks are available that illuminate path-
ways toward appropriate answers to such questions, any adequate
response to Gans's analysis ought to direct attention toward a principled
conceptual framework, within which courts can discover when corporate
constitutional and/or statutory rights exists in a given case. In spite of
the renewed appeal of corporate separateness, Professor Buccola's schol-
arship, in concert with others, offers a plausible and principled conceptu-
al framework within which to commence the pursuit of answers.
IV. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Supplying analysis that echoes Meese and Oman's scholarship re-
garding free-exercise rights of corporations within the meaning of
RFRA,266 Buccola "points to a unifying method in the Court's apparent
madness.,267 Buccola argues "that the great bulk of the Court's corpo-
rate-rights jurisprudence reflects an interpretive principle that can be
called "organizational neutrality.,268 Rather than reifying legal "sepa-
rateness" as a dispositive attribute, the Justices, consistent with the range
of choices available to an entrepreneur, "ascribe corporate rights such
that entrepreneurs are neither rewarded nor punished for selecting the
264. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 20, at 4-6.
265. Id. at 6.
266. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 275 (offering three basic laims in support of
corporate rights including: (a) that "corporate law itself does not discourage for-profit
corporations from advancing religion[,]" (b) that religious for-profit businesses "do not
undermine the goals of corporate law, nor would it undermine such goals to grant these
firms religious exemptions from otherwise neutral laws in appropriate cases[,]" (c) that
"given the plausible reasons for protecting religious exercise by for-profit corporations,
there is [little] reason to reject the most natural reading of RFRA's text, namely that 'per-
son' includes private corporations of all kinds").This framework appears to be compatible
with Buccola's organizational neutrality analysis.
267. Buccola, supra note 20, at 4.
268. Id. at 4-5.
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corporate form over other modes of social coordination," such as part-
nerships, proprietorships, LLCs, or nonprofit firms.269 This account re-
veals that the "Court holds that corporations can exercise a given right
otherwise attributable to natural persons if denying it would penalize en-
trepreneurs' decision to integrate productive activity into an incorporated
entity.,270 The converse is likewise true, and, therefore, "the Court holds
that corporations cannot exercise a right otherwise attributable to natural
persons if recognizing it would subsidize integration-if, that is, it would
bias entrepreneurs toward incorporation.
' 271
After Buccola attends to a number of illustrations, it is possible to
deduce that while a natural person has a right to exercise his or her reli-
gion either within the meaning of the First Amendment or RFRA, it is
likewise apparent that an incorporated entity holds title to its religious
rights in its own right, at least for purposes of litigation since the depriva-
tion of such rights would otherwise distort economic activity.272 This is
so because the deprivation of religious liberty to a corporate entity
grounded solely in its mode of integration would and should encourage
entrepreneurs to select other modes of social coordination. The logic of
Buccola's contribution, coupled with the indeterminate nature of corpo-
rate separateness as an explanatory vehicle, point us in one direction:
corporations, as a general matter, ought to retain rights to bring free-
exercise claims because to do otherwise would bias business formation in
the direction of partnerships or sole proprietorships. This conclusion
tracks with the rich possibilities Meese and Oman demonstrate in their
scholarship: within the nexus of contract framework, the structure of
governance is contingent and contractual, thus enabling shareholders to
unify ownership and control and exercise the same prerogatives as own-
ers of non-corporate businesses all while maintaining limited liability.
2 7 3
As a consequence of this process, shareholders customarily impose
their religion on corporations.274 In practice, it is worth noting that (1)
for-profit corporations infused with their owners' religion are common;
(2) such businesses do no violence to corporate law, which is primarily
contractual and facilitative; (3) there is no evidence that hese firms gen-
erate greater corporate dysfunction than their secular counterparts; and
(4) despite the fact that, for some purposes, society treats corporations as
legally distinct, this is simply a pragmatic choice rather than a normative
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 5-7.
273. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 277-79.
274. Id. at 279-80.
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judgment that human concerns do not apply to such firms.275 If corporate
status alone serves to deprive firms of the right to practice their religion,
as Gans and others contend, such a rule would appear to incentivize
firms to reform themselves as LLCs, LLPs, partnerships, or sole proprie-
torships. An appropriate understanding of incentives and human behav-
ior indicates that an overemphasis on corporate separateness as an adju-
dicative tool operates contrary to the principle of organizational neutrali-
neutrality. Since the legal separateness of the corporation is largely
pragmatic rather than normative, "[c]orporations are just [the] means by
which groups of people pursue common purposes," signifying that he
"acknowledging the exercise of religion by for-profit corporations is by
no means a category mistake27 6 This is particularly true of closely held
corporations, despite the fact that there is no singular definition or uni-
form corporate law on closely held corporations.277 Organizational neu-
trality in the context of entrepreneurial choice divests the concept of cor-
porate personhood of its talismanic force.278  Therefore, the widely
supported "legal separateness" trope is unlikely to divorce most for-
profit corporations from eligibility for exemptive relief within the mean-
ing of RFRA or the Constitution. The next section examines implica-
tions arising from this conclusion in the context of Gans's claims.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Prologue
Recall that Gans commences his analysis by agreeing that corpora-
tions have some constitutional and statutory rights.2 79 Questions surface
regarding whether his assessment of for-profit corporations offers a per-
suasive taxonomy of when corporate personhood enjoys and ought to en-
joy constitutional and/or statutory protection. Gans stresses (1) the sup-
posedly dispositive understanding of corporations enclosed by the
nation's Framers, a platform that supports his foundational contention
that it is impossible for natural persons to alienate their religious exercise
to a corporation;280 and (2) the presumption that corporate separateness
275. Id. at 300.
276. Id.
277. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 16.
278. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 279-84 (contesting the importance of the
corporate form and corporate personhood for purposes of impartial adjudication and
showing how entrepreneurial choices can void any operational separation between own-
ership and management of closely held firms).
279. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 9 (Gans).
280. Id. at 17 (Gans).
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and the limited liability status of for-profit corporations disqualifies uch
firms from being eligible for an exemption.281
Subsection B shows that a persuasive account of corporate person-
hood entails more than an acknowledgement of the metaphysical fact that
corporations, as opposed to natural human beings, are bereft of souls, or
that corporate separateness, limited liability, or the pursuit of profit com-
bine to preclude the exercise of corporate rights. Initially, this exposition
refrains from focusing on the actual facts of Hobby Lobby. Instead, Sub-
section B builds on the clarifying framework instantiated in Part III to
develop conceptual answers to relevant questions. Next, Subsection B
provides an opportunity to interrogate Gans's corporate rights elucidation
by scrutinizing the specific corporate employers in Hobby Lobby through
the prism provided by the clarifying framework.
Subsection C suggests that Gans fails to consider one of the most
salient attributes of Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood: their
status as employers within the meaning of the ACA. If this attribute is
essential, as Professor Buccola suggests, then the germane question is not
whether the Hobby Lobby corporations have the same or different consti-
tutional or statutory rights as natural persons. Rather, the relevant ques-
tion in this subsection, as in Subsection B, is whether the Hobby Lobby
entities as employers ought to be treated differently from any other cog-
nizable employer such as a proprietorship, nonprofit corporation, ecclesi-
astical corporation, or whatever the case may be. Finally, Subsection D
wraps up my critique.
B. Corporate Rights? Examining Gans's Claims on the Road to Hobby
Lobby
1. Gans's Thesis in the Mirror of Closely Held Firms
Admittedly, the Constitution does not specifically mention corpora-
tions in its text, but nevertheless, it does establish rights for "persons,"
"people," and "citizens., 282 Textual absence and indeed textual presence
cohere with hermeneutical challenges, thus producing a quandary that
infects the application of statutory law (both state and federal) to for-
profit businesses.283 Textual absence or presence may likewise infect
any analysis of nonprofits as well. Language or its absence is part of the
281. Id. at 22.
282. ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 10-15 (2010) (observing the absence of textual references to
corporations in the Constitution).
283. See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397(2011) (offering an interpretation on
the question of whether corporations have a right to personal privacy within the meaning
of the Freedom of Information Act).
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lens through which we see the world, a world that cannot be seen without
distortion, despite Jean Jacques Rousseau's aspirations to the contrary.284
Gans relies largely on history as his preferred gap-filler for purposes of
interpreting the rights of corporations to fortify his contention that corpo-
rate rights should be viewed mainly as an unjustifiable anomaly.285 Of-
fering a form of metaphysical idealism that resembles Berkeley's roman-
ticized view of the text,286 Gans submits that, despite the fact that corpo-
corporations are formed by natural human beings (who themselves are
part of the category referred to as "We the People"), the Constitution
fails to supply any explicit legal protections for corporate entities even
after the Framers added the Bill of Rights to protect the fundamental
rights of citizens.287 What is missing, as Jacques Derrida might point
out, is not simply the text, but context, wherein everything (including
linguistic convention) requires interpretation.288 Hence, Gans's attention
to the Framers understanding of corporations appears at variance with the
fact that "[m]ore than a century ago, states eased restrictions that regulat-
ed corporate behavior through their charters and various doctrines of
corporate law. 289 Instead, corporations "became primarily regulated by
regimes outside of corporate law.,290 As a consequence, for-profit cor-
porations exhibit a variety of structures that are often at odds with Berle
and Means's conception. Though Gans concedes that corporations have
some important constitutional rights,29' within the domain of adjudicative
norms, he fails to explain adequately why and when important constitu-
tional or statutory rights are, and ought to be, available to modem corpo-
rations in some cases and why such rights are, and ought to be, lacking in
others.
Rather than develop a conceptual framework of corporate rights,
one that rightly notes that there is no single model of corporate govern-
ance, one that observes that there is no fundamental distinction between
closely held corporations and the partnerships or sole proprietorships
they imitate,292 and one that admittedly requires interpretation, Gans pre-
sents readers with unexplained puzzles. For instance, he observes that an
284. See, e.g., JAMES K. A. SMITH, supra note 225, at 35-37 (discussing Derrida and
Rousseau).
285. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 14 (Gans).
286. JAMES K. A. SMITH, supra note 225, at 35.
287. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 7 (Gans).
288. JAMES A. K. SMITH, supra note 225, at 42-44.
289. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 20.
290. Id. at 20-21 (adverting to the fact that employee protections are left to em-
ployment and labor law and likewise suggesting that consumers and other business par-
ticipants are protected by regimes outside of corporate law).
291. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 9 (Gans).
292. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 287.
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individual owner who operates an unincorporated business has the legal
capacity to assert an objection based on the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination whereas a corporation cannot.293 Gans, offer-
ing sparse analysis in comparison with Professor Garrett,294 cannot ex-
plain why this difference in treatment exists other than that the invoca-
tion of anthropomorphic qualities, such as conscience and human
dignity, are unavailable for corporations.295 Gans falls back on a familiar
refrain: when an owner of a firm acts on behalf of a corporation, she is
not engaging in conduct in her individual capacity and is accordingly
disentitled to invoke individual rights.296 Although he frequently sum-
mons human dignity as an explanatory tool to explain why corporations,
as a general matter, cannot invoke free-exercise rights, Gans nonetheless
admits that for-profit "corporations enjoy rights under the Free Speech
Clause, not because they possess personal dignity or freedom of con-
science [-they do not-], but because of the fundamental role...
speech plays in [a] democracy.,297 Concurrently, he fails to explain why
corporations possess constitutional rights within the realm of property
and commerce298 when one could likewise argue that the owners should
not be entitled to appeal to due process or the Fourteenth Amendment's
provision against unlawful discrimination because they are not natural
persons, an approach that appears to have influential legs in the Con-
gress.299
After largely expending the explanatory force of human dignity,
Gans returns to the contention that there is a chasm that separates share-
holders or corporate owners who as individuals can pray and the corpora-
tion, operating as a legally separate entity, cannot.300 Gans submits that
"corporate owners 'cannot move freely between corporate and individual
status to gain the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of the respec-
tive forms."'30' He stipulates (despite evidence to the contrary)30 2 that
293. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 21 (Gans).
294. See generally, Garrett, supra note 20, at 138-47 (asserting that the legal struc-
ture of a corporation prevents for-profit corporations from being treated like associations
or nonprofit entities).
295. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 21 (Gans).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 9.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 90, at 311 (describing a proposed People's
Rights Amendment to the Constitution that would say that the rights protected by the
Constitution are rights of natural persons).
300. GANs & SHAPRO, supra note 2, at 17 (Gans).
301. Id. at 22 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U. S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-356) (Gans)).
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
because corporations benefit from limited liability, which he asserts is
unavailable to natural persons, and because free exercise is inseparable
from human actors, corporate employers cannot now object when they
are denied free-exercise rights because of their status as corporations.3 °3
At the same time, Gans does not notice that individuals associated with
non-profit corporations or even the owners of sole proprietorships, under
the right circumstances, can also benefit from limited liability without
risking their religious liberty rights.3 Yet Gans has not been heard to
complain that either the application of limited liability status to such enti-
ties or, alternatively, their status as artificial institutions, as the case may
be, disqualifies them from a religious exemption. On the contrary, he
admits that such institutions qualify for accommodation.30 5 Lastly, Gans
fails to notice that, although Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan agree that
the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs' challenge to the contraceptive coverage re-
quirement fails on the merits, these Justices did not decide that for-profit
corporations or owners are ineligible to bring claims under RFRA.3 06 In_
stead, the Justices declined to agree with Justice Ginsburg's contention
that the plaintiffs' for-profit corporate status deprives them of RFRA per-
sonhood.307
On the other hand, Buccola's approach, in combination with the
scholarship of Rienzi and Meese and Oman, offers plausible reasons why
most corporations, as closely held entities, look very much like sole pro-
prietorships, associations, and partnerships.30 8 If this is true and quite
apart from an inspection of the specific organizational structure of Con-
estoga Wood, Hobby Lobby Stores, or Mardel, it appears that the organi-
zational neutrality standard offers a sturdy platform from which to de-
fend corporate rights. To repeat, the Justices tacitly respond to the
possibility that myriad entrepreneurial choices produce a plethora of
economic vehicles, and they accordingly ascribe corporate rights such
that entrepreneurs would neither be rewarded nor punished for selecting
the corporate form over other modes of social coordination.30 9 Risking
302. See, e.g., Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 286-87 (explaining why limited li-
ability status fails to justify stripping corporations of their religious personhood).
303. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 22-23 (Gans).
304. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 286 (demonstrating that sole proprietorships
can bargain with all creditors for limited liability and suggesting that the result of such
bargaining would have no impact on the ability of such entities' free-exercise rights).
305. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 28 (admitting tacitly that religious institu-
tions including the artificial entity, an ecclesiastical corporation in Hosanna-Tabor are
entitled to accommodation (Gans)).
306. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,2806 (2014) (Breyer &
Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
307. Id.
308. See supra Parts 11 & III.
309. Buccola, supra note 20, at 4-5.
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further repetition, the "Court holds that corporations can exercise a given
right otherwise attributable to natural persons if denying it would penal-
ize entrepreneurs' decision to integrate productive activity into an incor-
porated entity."31  The opposite is also correct.31  Thus realized, organi-
zational neutrality could be seen as both a positive and normative
standard that neither biases entrepreneurs toward or away from integra-
tion nor grants a subsidy to artificial entities at the expense of natural
persons. 312 This approach fits well with the reality that the corporate
form can be essentially identical, in practice, to a partnership or sole pro-
prietorship wherein the various possible entities available to entrepre-
neurs are all operationalized within a default rule paradigm that reifies
customization.313  This progression permits entrepreneurs to decide
which business form is optimal and allows them to deviate from the
wealth maximization norm. In harmony with organizational neutrality,
IRS rules and regulations commonly treat many corporations as entities
that are indistinguishable from sole proprietorships for tax purposes, that
is, indistinguishable from their owners.31 4 This outline shows that Gans's
understanding of corporations is insufficiently conceptual as he over-
looks the explanatory power of organizational neutrality for purposes of
corporate rights adjudication, and the possible fusion of entrepreneurial
choice with the corporate form. Corporate theory shows that volitional
choice gives rise to a process that enables the establishment of firms that
are nominally separate from their owners, but actually and operationally
virtually undifferentiated from them.315
Operationally, shareholders advance the indistinguishability of
owners and the firm by imposing their views on a corporation via the
corporate charter consistent with the fact that many charters empower the
corporation to pursue any lawful business or purpose, a default option
that state law provides.316 The incorporators may adopt a charter reflect-
ing shareholder views about what business the firm conducts, how to
conduct it, how to limit the products the firm may sell, what days it may
operate, what belief system the firm will subscribe, to or what wages the
entity may pay.317 Such provisions could impose the views of founding
310. Id. at 5.
311. Id. (stating that "the Court holds that corporations cannot exercise a right oth-
erwise attributable to natural persons if recognizing it would subsidize integration-if,
that is, it would bias entrepreneurs toward incorporation").
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 280-87.
314. Rienzi, supra note 20, at 97-98.
315. See, e.g., Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 280-85.
316. Id. at 281-82.
317. Id. at 282 (focusing much of their analysis and attention on Delaware law).
2015]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
shareholders and perhaps even reduce profits.318 Alternatively, share-
holders may elect directors who wish to amend the charter, or they can
accomplish the same objective by amending the bylaws on their own ini-
tiative.319 Other avenues are available to shareholders in closely held
corporations who wish to control and operate the firm themselves. First,
shareholders in such firms do not need to amend the charter or bylaws to
implement their views because they can execute shareholder agreements
constraining the firm, or shareholders can simply eliminate directors al-
together and vest themselves with operational control over the corpora-
tion, effectively replicating the management and ownership structure of a
partnership.320 Although religiously motivated decision-making within
firms operated by manager-shareholders may sometimes increase prof-
its,321 the maximization of profits as an objective likely is waivable.
22
This is so despite the case law that may indicate that fiduciaries must
maximize profits, because it is equally likely that shareholders can waive
this rule like other default rules, particularly when the shareholders unan-
imously amend the charter to valorize such a choice.323 This intuition
tracks the fact that corporate law even empowers shareholders by a unan-
imous vote to ratify alleged corporate waste:324 "In sum, modem corpo-
rate law [consistent with entrepreneurial choice] provides shareholders of
closely held corporations with numerous tools for structuring the firm to
mirror the allocation of responsibilities in other forms of business enter-
prises, including partnerships.3 25 Further, "there is simply no distinction
relevant to the exercise of religion between the nexus of contracts known
as the partnership and that known as the closely held corporation.
3 26
Despite Gans's contentions to the contrary, it is manifest that sharehold-
ers operating through the above-referenced governance arrangements
within the context of closely held firms-often called for-profit "incor-
porated partnerships"-would still retain limited liability, unlike partners
in a general partnership, and the firms themselves would retain artificial
entity status.327 Nor should the firms' status as artificial entities foreclose
free-exercise rights any more than the incorporated status of a church,
synagogue, or mosque would, despite the fact that many also have mem-
318. Id.
319. Id. at 282-83.
320. Id. at 283-84.
321. Id. at 284.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 284-85.
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bers, who, like shareholders, enjoy limited liability and some even en-
gage in commercial activity.
328
Conclusions, surfacing within the domain of closely held firms, ap-
propriately re-emphasize this question: should the Hobby Lobby firms be
treated any differently than a sole proprietorship, mosque, or partnership
for ACA purposes by virtue of the fact that they are organized as corpo-
rations? Although a similar issue previously divided analyses of the Cit-
izens United Court because some commentators asserted that for-profit
corporations, operating under a cloud of disfavor, are bereft of constitu-
tional rights,329 the onus remains on opponents to offer credible reasons
for the non-existence of corporate constitutional or statutory rights. This
Article next turns to the specific plaintiff firms and their organizational
structure as part of its claim that much is missing from Gans's analysis.
2. Applying the Framework to actual Hobby Lobby Plaintiffs.
This subsection applies the above-referenced framework to the ac-
tual governance arrangements deployed by the three Hobby Lobby plain-
tiff-firms to ascertain whether the corporations ought to retain free-
exercise rights. It sets forth each corporation's governance arrangements
in turn.
The Hahn family, consisting of Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and
their three sons, are devout members of the Mennonite Church that own
and operate Conestoga Wood, incorporating their religious beliefs into
the governance and operation of the firm. 3 30 Their church, part of a
Christian denomination opposing abortion, believes that a fetus, in its
earliest stages, shares humanity with those who conceived it. 331 Under
Pennsylvania law, the Hahns exercise sole ownership of the business and
control its board.332 They hold all of its voting shares, operate the com-
pany in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral principles, and
commit to a moral injunction that ensures a reasonable profit in a manner
that reflects their religious heritage.333 "As explained in Conestoga's
board-adopted 'Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,' the Hahns be-
lieve that human life begins at conception.,334 Consistent with this poli-
cy and operating as an association of likeminded people, they sought an
accommodation within the meaning of RFRA from the ACA's contra-
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 394-95, 427
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).






PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
ceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide health-insurance
coverage for four FDA-approved contraceptives.335
The Green family, consisting of David and Barbara Green and their
three children, are Christians who own and operate two family business-
es, Hobby Lobby Stores and Mardel.336 The Hobby Lobby firm is orga-
nized as a for-profit corporation under Oklahoma law.337 The company
has a very small number of shareholders and the family retains exclusive
control with David and his three children serving as officers.338 Hobby
Lobby's statement of purpose commits the Greens to "honoring the Lord
in all that they do" through the corporations; each family member has
signed a pledge to run the business in accordance with the family's reli-
gious beliefs and to use the family assets to support Christian minis-
tries.339 In defense of its statement of purpose, Hobby Lobby sued HHS
and other federal agencies and officials, challenging the contraceptive
mandate within the meaning of RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.34 °
Mardel is organized as a for-profit corporation under Oklahoma law with
a tightly limited number of shareholders.341 Mardel was started by one of
David Green's sons and operates as an affiliate of Hobby Lobby.342 Evi-
dently, from both a practical and conceptual perspective, Mardel features
governance and operational arrangements that mirror those of the Hobby
Lobby firm operated by the Green family.
343
An inspection of the respective Hobby Lobby firms' customized ar-
rangements discloses the owners' entrepreneurial choices, signifying that
each entity falls within a defendable definition of a closely held enter-
prise. The three firms have a limited number of shareholders who are
members of the same family, the shareholders retain exclusive control,
and there is no evidence of shareholder disagreements regarding the
goals, objectives, and missions of the respective firms. Thus cognized,
the respective firms are a medium through which individual sharehold-
ers, who share common beliefs, seek to make more effective the expres-
sion of their views within both the economic marketplace and the mar-
ketplace of ideas.34
The various Hobby Lobby corporations, coherent with Meese and
Oman's intuition, are unique entities issuing forth consistently with the




339. Id at 2766.
340. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
341. Id. at 2765.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 2765-66.
344. But see Garrett supra note 20, at 138 (disputing such claims).
[Vol. 120:2
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FOR EMPLOYERS
nexus-of-contracts paradigm that allows firms to emphasize values other
than profit-maximization.345 From an operational standpoint, there is lit-
tle evidence in the record that separates corporate ownership from con-
trol, and much evidence that suggests that the Hobby Lobby plaintiff-
firms are more like an association. This deduction paves the way for
such firms not only to represent the interest of their members, but also to
benefit from the Supreme Court's permissive and broad test for associa-
tional standing without having their governance arrangements closely
scrutinized. Moreover, the evidence on the ground does not indicate any
clash between the religious liberty objectives of the owners and operators
of the respective corporations and corporations as entities possessing a
separate legal existence. Rather, the shareholders and the respective cor-
porations themselves represent a constellation of common beliefs and fi-
nancial interests despite Garrett's deduction to the contrary.3 46 If true,
this analysis renders illusory the concept of corporate separateness with
regard to the actual plaintiff-firms' statutory or constitutional rights be-
cause no relevant separateness plausibly exists.
Given the size of each firm's shareholder group and operational
structure, each Hobby Lobby firm could rightly be called an "incorpo-
rated" partnership. Thus, if partnerships are eligible for an exemption
within the meaning of RFRA, it becomes doubtful that these respective
incorporated entities should be shorn of the right to an exemption from
the ACA mandate. Even if observers are persuaded to abandon reliance
on the Dictionary Act's inclusion of corporations within its definition of
persons, or alternatively, to forsake Buccola's organizational neutrality
standard, Conestoga Wood, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel ought to be seen
as persons (that have standing) for purposes of litigating most constitu-
tional and statutory rights claims because it is impossible to draw a neat
line between the firms and a partnership. This analysis imperils Gans's
understanding of the actual Hobby Lobby plaintiffs' governance ap-
proach.
Notwithstanding the force of this conclusion, the Dictionary Act
definition of a person may prove useful. For instance, Gans revisits his-
tory, provoked by Justice Alito's comment that the Obama administra-
tion has already conceded that non-profit corporations could be consid-
ered exempt persons within the meaning of RFRA-a concession that
contradicts the allegation that for-profit corporations are not covered by
RFRA (because there is no dictionary definition of the phrase "corpora-
tions" that could include non-profits but not for profit firms). 34 7 Despite
345. Meese & Oman, supra note 20, at 283.
346. Garrett, supra note 20,at 145.
347. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 59 (Rosen).
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Justice Alito's analysis, Gans declares that the unbroken history from the
Founding until Hobby Lobby, of treating religious organizations differ-
ently from commercial enterprises when it comes to religious free-
exercise rights, impugns the Court's holding.348 Underscoring the pur-
ported distinction between secular, for-profit corporations on one hand,
and churches and other religious bodies organized for purposes of engag-
ing in religious exercise on the other, Gans argues religious bodies alone
are entitled to religious exemptions.349 This claim mirrors the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia's view350 and plainly echoes Justice
Ginsburg's Hobby Lobby dissenting opinion, wherein she proclaimed,
"there has always been a fundamental difference between secular, for-
profit corporations, organized to make running a business more profita-
ble, and churches and other religious bodies, organized for the purpose of
engaging in religious exercise.'351
As an initial matter, such claims fail to account for the possibility
that religious groups also engage in commercial activity and nevertheless
retain eligibility for religious accommodation for free-exercise purposes.
Second, neither Justice Ginsburg nor Gans's approach accounts for the
possibility that for-profit firms, congruent with the outline provided by
Meese and Oman, may be organized for both religious and commercial
purposes consistent with the myriad possibilities associated with entre-
preneurial choice. Recall that the actual governance structure of the re-
spective Hobby Lobby firms mirrors Meese and Oman's exposition of the
possible governance arrangements within the boundaries of closely held
firms. Third, neither Justice Ginsburg nor Gans's claims fit within the
organizational neutrality framework that has previously undergirded the
Court's analysis-wherein the Court defends corporate rights so as not to
bias entrepreneurial choice in one direction or another-thus enabling
corporate owners to move freely between corporate and individual status,
and therefore, contrary to Gans's claims, to gain the advantages and
avoid the disadvantages of the respective forms.352 Fourth, Gans's ap-
proach appears to offer shifting contentions without providing principles
that sustain his approach. Recall that he previously emphasized corpo-
rate separateness was dispositive of whether for-profit firms enjoy free-
exercise rights, but inconsistent with that claim, he was prepared to allow
most religious bodies (organized as corporations replete with limited lia-
348. Id. at 59-60 (Gans).
349. Id.
350. Gilardi v. U.S. Dept. Health & Hum. Svs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (holding that when it comes to corporations only religious organizations are ac-
corded protection).
351. GANS & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 59-60 (Gans).
352. Id. at 22.
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bility) to enjoy free exercise.153 Fifth, the relevant corporate-law ques-
tion "was whether Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood are the
kinds of entities who can exercise religion within the RFRA's mean-
ing. '354 Because "RFRA's prohibition of governmental burdens on reli-
gious exercise applies to the exercise of all 'persons,"' then it makes
sense to consider the Dictionary Act itself, which "defines 'person' to in-
clude corporations.,355 Although Buccola correctly argues that this fact
alone does not decide the case, simply because not all persons are neces-
sarily capable of exercising religion,35 6 it is self-evident that corporations
may be "persons" and the oversight of natural persons who compose
them may incline such organizations toward conduct that accords with a
particular religious tradition.357 "Yet[,] lacking mind[,] corporations lack
the phenomenology of belief, hope, fear, or whatever that constitutes re-
ligious experience.,358 The relevant issue becomes not whether a firm
can "have religion" in some anthropomorphic sense, but rather, whether
the religion of humans should, in fairness, be attributed to the plaintiff
firms.
3 59 This question can be answered through an analogy. To wit,
since not one Supreme Court Justice offered an opinion claiming that the
religion of humans, who are members of religious institutions, should not
in fairness be attributed to religious bodies (corporate or not), it appears
that a similar attribution ought to apply to for-profit corporations as well
signifying that free-exercise rights surface for such firms.
C. The Salience of Employer Status Within the Meaning of the ACA
As Professor Buccola notes, opponents of the Hobby Lobby deci-
sion "have asked why the religious views of the shareholder-managers
counted in the Court's analysis, but not the views of other patrons, such
as employees.3 60  Once again, organizational neutrality explains why
employers' views count.361 Buccola shows that, despite its clumsy lan-
guage,362 the Hobby Lobby Court was merely trying to locate the person
to be regulated, absent the corporate form the ACA would have regarded
353. Id. at 28 (discussing the religious body that operates Hosanna-Tabor).






360. Id. at 44.
361. Id.
362. Id. (showing that the Court inconsistently referred to "shareholders," "owners,"
and "owners and controllers" in attempting to find the persons whom, absent the corpo-
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as the "employer.3 63  "[A]lithough the majority opinion declares that
recognizing a free-exercise claim would protect the companies' 'owners
and controllers,' it does not logically follow that every corporate exercise
of religion would protect the shareholder-managers directly. 3 64 Within
the corporate structure of Conestoga Wood, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel,
the controllers could be directors, shareholders, managers, or all of the
above. But, most importantly for our current purposes is the simple fact
that the "regulation at issue in Hobby Lobby was a regulation of employ-
ers-in particular employers with 50 or more employees-and thus neu-
trality directed the Court to consider what rights such employers would
have had in an analogous but unincorporated enterprise, for example in a
proprietorship.,365 Thus appreciated, the religious commitments of Con-
estoga Wood's, Hobby Lobby's, and Mardel's shareholder-managers
were central to appropriately deciding the case, not because they owned
the capital contribution, but because they were the employers of record
pursuant to a series of agreements arising out of the entrepreneurial
choice framework. On the other hand, if the shareholder-owners had de-
cided to reconfigure the governance structure of the respective firms and
elect non-religious directors for purposes of managing the firm, then
such directors, as the employers of record, would likewise be empowered
to decline to seek an exemption from the ACA mandate. Moreover,
since the ACA regulation at issue is directed toward employers, it neu-
trally applies to all employers whether they are for-profit, nonprofit, reli-
gious, non-religious, incorporated, or unincorporated entities. If any
such employers are entitled to an exemption, it is manifest that all other
employers ought to be equally entitled to an accommodation, despite
Gans's contention that religious bodies alone are entitled to religious ex-
366emptions. Taken as a whole, this subsection shows that Gans's analy-
sis, as well as his understanding of corporate theory and the pertinent
ACA regulations, is problematic.
D. Wrapping Up
Before the government grants a conscience-protecting exemption to
a religious believer, the government must first have to conclude that the
person or institution in question is indeed exercising a religious belief
that calls for an exemption.367 This inquiry is highly complex, in part,
363. Id.
364. Buccola, supra note 20, at 44. (citations omitted).
365. Id. at 42-43 (emphasis omitted).
366. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 59-60 (Gans).
367. This formulation of the basis for exemptions, on one account may be too nar-
row. See, Michael J. Perry, American Religious Freedom: Reflections on Koppelman and
Smith, 77 REV. OF POL. 287, 295 (2015) (asking whether it is constitutional to grant con-
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because religion itself is a complicated concept.368 Complexity further
arises regarding whether the party seeking an exemption falls within ei-
ther the appropriate constitutional or statutory category that entitles it to
be seen as a person within the meaning of the law. Hobby Lobby pivots
around the question of whether or not exemptions from generally appli-
cable law are available to for-profit firms, despite evidence that clearly
shows that corporations are persons for many constitutional and statutory
purposes.
Although it is manifest that Hobby Lobby, like Citizens United, adds
weight to the work of corporate law while shining a light on what corpo-
rate law does and does not do,369 it is equally plain that the weight of
scholarly opinion opposes religious liberty rights for corporate employ-
ers370 premised on the conclusion that to hold the opposite view amounts
to a misapprehension of the separation between shareholders and the
firm, a view that is allegedly the hallmark of the corporate form.371 This
position, which coincides with the linchpins of Gans's analysis-limited
liability, legal separateness, and the pursuit of profit-would leave the
Hobby Lobby employers, who are neither mythical creatures nor natural
persons in high dudgeon, without the capability to pursue religious ac-
commodation. As we have seen, Gans frequently adverts to the forceful
claim that allowing for-profit corporations to assert free-exercise rights
within the meaning of either the Constitution or a statute would deprive
employees of important positive rights guaranteed by the ACA. Whether
this contention is accurate or not, it fails to inform readers why concern
for third-parties is necessarily dispositive to for-profit corporations be-
cause he does not explain why putative third-party harm cannot prevent
employers who operate religious institutions (which are often corpora-
tions), sole proprietorships, or nonprofit corporate entities from gaining
an accommodation that he is prepared to deny the Hobby Lobby employ-
ers.
This Article shows that the for-profit, limited liability structure of
the Hobby Lobby firms is unlikely to disqualify them from asserting free-
exercise rights, despite the fact that they are legally separate from their
shareholders. Additionally, such customized firms are not required to
science-protecting exemptions only to religious believers). But see generally Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of a Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (offering a defense of accommodation for religious believers).
368. Aaron R. Petty, Accommodating "Religion",TENN. L. REv. (Feb. 5, 2015,
forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), http://ssm.com/abstract-2560867.
369. Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory, supra note 20, at 20.
370. Buccola, supra note 20, at 37.
371. Id. The leading perspective on the Hobby Lobby case apparently surfaces in an
amicus brief filed and signed by 44 scholars of corporate and criminal law. See generally
Law Professors' Brief, supra note 62, at 1-13.
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maximize profits, which signifies that the respective firms can maximize
other values. Moreover, Conestoga Wood, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel,
operating very much like "incorporated" partnerships, membership or-
ganizations, or associations, rather than publicly-held corporations, can
establish standing sufficient to defend their free-exercise rights irrespec-
tive of whether such rights are properly derivative or direct.372 Further-
more, the presumption that free-exercise claims are purely personal and
individual, and thus that the exercise of religion can only characterize
natural persons,373 cannot bar the respective firms, as employers, from
exercising their religion within a collective group any more than such
claims can bar mosques, synagogues, or churches that operate within a
corporate structure from asserting their free-exercise rights. Gans's cen-
tral claim that the owners of the Hobby Lobby corporations, as employ-
ers, ought to forfeit their RFRA rights because they organized their re-
spective entities as a corporation as opposed to a partnership, nonprofit,
or sole proprietorship, is unconvincing. Taken as a whole, this subsec-
tion shows that Gans's conclusion that for-profit corporations, in general,
and the Hobby Lobby plaintiff-firms, in particular, lack free-exercise
rights is afflicted with numerous shortcomings. Equally important,
commentary, which stresses the identity of the corporate form, or the
presumably dispositive character of the often legally correct but opera-
tionally insignificant notion of "separation of ownership and control" as
a defining attribute of most for-profit corporations, appears to be orthog-
onal to both the concept of organizational neutrality and the entrepre-
neurial-choice paradigm from which most customized corporations
emerge.
VI. CONCLUSION
A careful examination of the shortcomings of David Gans's analysis
suggests that, to solve the riddle of corporate religious liberties, any dis-
cussion of the Hobby Lobby decision should focus less on what the cor-
rect outcome ought to be, and more on recognizing the principles that
ought to govern similar cases going forward. Far from exalting corpora-
tions above individuals, as Gans contends, the Hobby Lobby Court right-
ly treats a corporation like an individual, thus giving rise to a contest of
rights between two individuals or groups of individuals. In answering
how, if at all, the treatment of the Hobby Lobby employers' free-exercise
372. Blair & Pollman, supra note 30, at 1731 (stating that Court accepts the argu-
ment that corporations represent an association of natural persons and that this argument
clearly indicates corporate rights to be derivative, not direct or original rights).
373. For a defense of the claim that religion is characteristic of natural persons, not
artificial entities, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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claims should differ from others' (assuming they were organized as for-
profit sole proprietorships rather than for-profit corporations), it is possi-
ble to grasp the analytical insufficiencies associated with Gans's ap-
proach to corporate rights. Though he relies exhaustively on the intellec-
tual history of the Founding, as part of a reverential tapestry that
precludes free-exercise rights for corporations, Ilya Shapiro illuminates
that such history is of dubious significance "because at that time ... cor-
porations were more like what we would now consider to be quasi-
governmental public utilities than modem businesses.374 Corporations
today, unlike what was typical during the Founding epoch, do not rely on
royal charters, national charters, or permissions slips from elites.
375 In-
stead, modem for-profit corporations exist as a nexus of contracts be-
tween various rights-bearing individuals, and this contract is "recognized
by [state] law [in order] to facilitate commerce.3 76 Although a corpora-
tion is not a real person, and although some constitutional rights make
little sense as applied to corporations,377 corporations nevertheless em-
body an association of people-officers, directors, employees, and
shareholders-who are natural born individuals.378 Thus, it is likely that
Gans and other scholars have simply overemphasized the corporate form
by conflating the existence of a right with the means used to exercise it.
This exposition prompts a syllogism: a denial of rights to a corpo-
ration denies rights to natural, right-bearing individuals represented in
the firm. As the entrepreneurial choice framework shows, it is abundant-
ly clear that volitional choice could give rise to a wide variety of alterna-
tive firms that are operated as unincorporated associations by natural per-
sons, as opposed to artificial persons (e.g., partnerships, LLCs or LLPs),
or alternatively by a single individual (e.g., sole proprietorship). Finally,
it appears that virtually everyone justly concedes that such non-corporate
entities retain free-exercise rights either within the RFRA framework or
within the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Such firms, acting as
employers within the meaning of the ACA, are the decision-makers on
whether they will pursue RFRA or Free Exercise Clause claims. Irre-
spective of whether such employers prevail on the merits of their claim,
virtually no one denies that such employers retain free-exercise rights.
Courts, in responding to this state of affairs, ought to find Professor Buc-
374. GANs & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 1 l(Shapiro).
375. Id.
376. Id. Coherent with such claims, Shapiro remarks that Justice John Marshall,
who is often cited for the observation "that corporations are artificial beings" in Dart-
mouth College, nevertheless ruled in favor of the "[]pre-modem[] corporation in its dis-
pute with the state." Id.
377. Id. at 10.
378. Id.
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cola's organizational neutrality framework useful and therefore, extend
equal rights to corporate employers arising out of the entrepreneurial
choice framework, despite the fact that they are not natural persons.
While this analysis does not indicate that any type of employer should
necessarily prevail under either the RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause, it
does suggest that all employers that pursue religious liberty are entitled
to their day in court, regardless of their organizational and governance
structure.
